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ABSTRACT 
In Gibbons v. Ogden, Chief Justice John Marshall famously wrote that “the enumeration 
presupposes something not enumerated.”  Modern courts use that phrase to mean that the 
Constitution’s enumeration of congressional powers indicates that those powers are, as a 
whole, less than a grant of general legislative authority.  But Marshall wasn’t saying that.  He 
wasn’t talking about the Constitution’s overall enumeration of congressional powers at all.  
He was writing about a different enumeration—the enumeration of three classes of commerce 
within the Commerce Clause.  And Marshall’s analysis of the Commerce Clause in Gibbons 
does not imply that the enumerated powers of Congress must in practice authorize less 
legislation than a grant of general legislative authority would.   
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“The enumeration presupposes something not enumerated[.]” 
—Chief Justice John Marshall, Gibbons v. Ogden1 
	
“I do not think it means what you think it means.” 
—Inigo Montoya, The Princess Bride2 
INTRODUCTION 
The federal government is a government of enumerated powers.  That 
axiom, which we can call the enumeration principle, is a fundamental creed 
of American constitutional law.  The enumeration principle is generally 
taken to imply a further proposition, the internal-limits canon, which holds 
that the powers of Congress are limited even without reference to affirma-
tive prohibitions like those in the Bill of Rights.3  Congress can legislate 
only on the basis of its enumerated powers, and the fact that the powers of 
Congress are enumerated, the theory runs, indicates that the sum total of 
Congress’s powers is less than plenary legislative authority.4 
When twenty-first century writers want to make the point that the enu-
meration of Congress’s powers indicates that those powers have limited 
 
 1 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1, 195 (1824). 
 2 THE PRINCESS BRIDE (Act III Communications 1987). 
 3 An internal limit on a governmental power is one that inheres in the grant of the power itself.  
See LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 297 (2d ed. 1988) (explaining that 
internal limits are those which are “inherent in the grants of power themselves.”).  The relevant 
contrast is with external limits, which block the exercise of power on the basis of some other 
source of authority.  See id. (describing external limits on congressional power as limits rooted, 
not in the affirmative grants of particular powers to Congress, but in the general structure of the 
Constitution or in particular prohibitory texts in the Constitution, such as those in the Bill of 
Rights).  Questions about the internal limits of congressional powers thus include: “Is this law a 
regulation of commerce?” and “Is this law a tax?”  Questions about the external limits of con-
gressional powers include: “Does this law abridge the freedom of speech?” and “Is this law a bill 
of attainder?”  The internal-limits canon insists that the powers of Congress are, collectively, 
subject to meaningful internal limits—that is, that there are things that Congress cannot do before 
one even begins to ask questions about free speech or bills of attainder. 
 4 See, e.g., United States v. Lopez, 514. U.S. 549, 567–68 (1995) (striking down the Gun-Free 
School Zones Act of 1990 on the theory that upholding the Act would fail to respect the principle 
that the enumerated powers of Congress are less than a general police power). 
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scope, they cite a famous dictum from Chief Justice John Marshall’s opin-
ion in Gibbons v. Ogden: “The enumeration presupposes something not 
enumerated . . . .”5  In United States v. Lopez, a case that turned largely on 
the idea that the powers of Congress must not be construed as the equiva-
lent of a general police power, the Court’s seventeen-page majority opinion 
quoted Marshall’s language three separate times.6  In the twenty years since 
Lopez, the dictum has been used that same way in a series of leading Su-
preme Court opinions addressing the outer bounds of Congress’s enumerat-
ed powers.7  Academic writers across the jurisprudential spectrum use Mar-
shall’s dictum in the same way.8 
Because John Marshall lived at the dawn of the Republic, and because 
the Gibbons dictum is taken to state a fundamental principle of constitu-
tional interpretation, it is easy to imagine that constitutional lawyers have 
always quoted Marshall’s formula as they do today—that is, as if it meant 
that the powers of Congress must add up to less than a general police pow-
er.  But they haven’t.  On the contrary, this use of Gibbons was new in the 
1990s.  Before the Lopez litigation, no reported decision of any American 
court, state or federal, ever used the Gibbons dictum to mean that the pow-
ers of Congress are, collectively, less than a grant of general legislative ju-
risdiction.9  In short, the present use of Marshall’s dictum to support the in-
ternal-limits canon is not a long-traditional practice in constitutional law.  It 
is a relatively new departure. 
 
 5 Gibbons, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) at 195. 
 6 See Lopez, 514 U.S. at 553, 566–67 (quoting Chief Justice Marshall’s language in Gibbons re-
garding the implication of Congress’ enumerated powers three separate times). 
 7 See, e.g., Bond v. United States, 134 S. Ct. 2077, 2099 (2014) (construing the limits of the treaty 
power); United States v. Kebodeaux, 133 S. Ct. 2496, 2507 (2013) (Roberts, C.J., concurring) 
(construing the limits of the Necessary and Proper Clause); Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebe-
lius, 132 S. Ct. 2566, 2577, 2591 (2012) (Roberts, C.J.) (construing the limits of the Commerce 
Clause). 
 8 See, e.g., David A. Strauss, Foreword: Does the Constitution Mean What it Says?, 129 HARV. L. 
REV. 1, 45 (2015) (reading the Gibbons dictum as expressing the idea that the powers of Con-
gress cannot reach all possible objects of legislation); Ernest Young, Federalism as a Constitu-
tional Principle, 83 U. CIN. L. REV. 1057, 1064, 1064 n.35 (2015) (using the Gibbons dictum to 
summarize the idea that the enumeration limits Congress); id. at 1066 (referring to the Gibbons 
dictum as a statement by Marshall about the limits of “national powers”); Kurt T. Lash, The Sum 
of All Delegated Power: A Response to Richard Primus, The Limits of Enumeration, 124 YALE 
L.J.F. 180, 182 (2014), http://www.yalelawjournal.org/forum/the-sum-of-all-delegated-power 
(treating the Gibbons dictum as if it articulated the idea that the Constitution’s enumeration of 
Congressional powers is limiting). 
 9 No reported case cited the relevant language at all between St. Louis Sw. Ry. Co. v. Allen, 187 
F. 290, 301–02 (E.D. Ark. 1911) and Lopez v. United States, 2 F.3d 1342, 1361 (5th Cir. 1993).  
When Lopez reached the Supreme Court, that Court picked up the Fifth Circuit’s use.  See Lopez, 
514 U.S. at 553, 566, 567 (incorporating relevant Gibbons language that “enumeration presup-
poses something not enumerated” three separate times in the majority opinion). 
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It is also a mistake.  Courts before Lopez did not quote Marshall’s dic-
tum to make the point that the powers of Congress cannot collectively be 
tantamount to general legislative jurisdiction because, to put it baldly, that 
isn’t what Marshall was saying.  Indeed, Marshall was not articulating a 
limit on federal regulation at all. 
Marshall in Gibbons was making a different point—one that went not to 
federal but to state regulatory power.  He was saying that so long as no 
federal law applied, states were free to regulate their own internal commer-
cial affairs.  That states can regulate their internal commercial affairs in the 
absence of federal law seems obvious today, so much so that it might seem 
odd that Marshall would have thought it a necessary to say so.  But in 1824, 
the idea that states could regulate their internal commerce in the absence of 
federal law was a point that needed making. 
Nineteenth-century courts understood perfectly well which point Mar-
shall meant to make.  Every judicial opinion to cite Marshall’s Gibbons 
dictum during the nineteenth century cited the language as justification for 
state regulation in the absence of federal law, not as a reason why some 
federal law might be invalid.10  Today, of course, courts and commentators 
adduce the Gibbons dictum as if it stated a limit on federal legislation and 
in particular as if it articulated the idea that the enumeration of congres-
sional powers necessarily limits what Congress can do.  In so doing, mod-
ern writers miss what Marshall was saying and use him to say something he 
did not mean. 
This misreading matters, and not only because as a general matter one 
should not present people as saying things they did not say.  It matters be-
cause, within American legal discourse, the fact that Marshall held a view 
in a famous case counts as a reason for taking that view seriously—perhaps 
even for regarding it as a presumptively correct statement of constitutional 
law.  The internal-limits canon—that is, the idea that the powers of Con-
gress must, collectively, be construed as limited even before one considers 
external limits like those in the Bill of Rights—should not be afforded that 
kind of authority.  The internal-limits canon is, to be sure, a traditional idea 
in constitutional law, and it is widely taken to be correct.  But for all its or-
thodoxy, the canon is unsound. 
Yes, the federal government is a government of enumerated powers.  
But as I have explained elsewhere, the fact that the powers of Congress are 
enumerated does not mean that those powers authorize less legislation than 
 
 10 See, e.g., Geer v. Connecticut, 161 U.S. 519 (1896) (upholding a Connecticut law regulating the 
killing of game); Brown v. Maryland, 25 U.S. (12 Wheat.) 419 (1827) (upholding a Maryland 
law requiring a license for the selling of imported goods). 
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a grant of general legislative authority would.11  On a proper understanding 
of constitutional text, history, and structure, the powers of Congress might 
in practice be sufficient to let Congress enact any legislation not affirma-
tively blocked by some constitutional prohibition, like those in the Bill of 
Rights.  In the end, whether the powers of Congress are collectively suffi-
cient to warrant any particular legislation is a question that can only be an-
swered by examining the powers Congress has, interpreting them sensibly, 
and applying them to the social world that exists at any given time.  Maybe, 
as applied to that world, the powers of Congress taken collectively are not 
as broad as a general police power would be.  But maybe they are. 
My complete argument for this view is complex, and I will not try to 
repeat it here in compressed form.  Readers who are interested should 
simply confront that argument where I have offered it.12  For present pur-
poses, suffice it to say that neither the text of Article I nor that of the Tenth 
Amendment establishes the internal-limits canon, unless those texts are 
read in light of a theory of federalism on which a limiting enumeration is 
necessary to preserve the federal structure, or a theory of originalist fidelity 
on which the Founding design requires the enumeration to be limiting, or 
some combination of the two.  And neither of those theories is correct.  
Federalism neither requires, nor is even particularly assisted by, a limiting 
enumeration.  It is better protected by more effective constitutional mecha-
nisms, some of which are external limits on Congressional power (like the 
anticommandeering rule13) and some of which are built into the structure 
and practical mechanics of government (like the broad range of practices 
and relationships that fall under the headings of process federalism and co-
operative federalism14).  Neither the text of the Constitution nor fidelity to 
the Founding design requires us to accomplish through the enumeration of 
congressional powers what is much better accomplished with these other 
mechanisms.  The Constitution clearly imposes process limits (like bicam-
eralism) and external limits (like those associated with the Bill of Rights) 
on Congress.  Whether it also imposes internal limits is a matter of contin-
gency: it depends on the best constructions of the various powers delegated 
to Congress and then upon how those powers actually apply to the social 
 
 11 See Richard Primus, The Limits of Enumeration, 124 YALE L.J. 576, 580–81 (2014) (arguing that 
the “internal-limits canon” is unsound). 
 12 Id. 
 13 See, e.g., New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 161 (1992) (rejecting a congressional power 
that would allow Congress to “commandee[r] the legislative processes of the States by directly 
compelling them to enact and enforce a federal regulatory program”) (quoting Hodel v. Virginia 
Surface Mining & Reclamation Assn., Inc., 452 U.S. 264, 288 (1981)). 
 14 See, e.g., Abbe R. Gluck, Intrastatutory Federalism and Statutory Interpretation: State Imple-
mentation of Federal Law in Health Reform and Beyond, 121 YALE L.J. 534, 584–88 (2011) (de-
scribing varying forms of process and cooperative federalism). 
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world.  Maybe that analysis would reveal a gap between what Congress can 
do and what it could do with a grant of general legislative authority, and 
maybe not, and the answer could vary over time.  But nothing in a proper 
understanding of constitutional text, history, and structure requires that the 
sum total of Congress’s powers authorizes less legislation than a grant of 
general jurisdiction would.15 
If I am right that the internal-limits canon is not a necessary principle of 
constitutional interpretation, then the idea that the enumeration principle 
implies the internal-limits canon is not just a fallacy but a dangerous falla-
cy.  The idea that the powers of Congress must have internal limits prompts 
courts to strike down legislation that should properly be considered valid.  
Lopez itself offers an example of a court striking down federal legislation 
largely on the theory that the powers of Congress must be subject to inter-
nal limits, as does United States v. Morrison.16  The same dynamic nearly 
repeated itself in NFIB v. Sebelius, with massively greater consequences.17  
To be sure, if the internal-limits canon were a sound rule of constitutional 
law, these cases might illustrate appropriate judicial implementation of that 
canon.  But if the internal-limits canon is unsound, then it is seriously prob-
lematic for courts to invalidate the duly enacted policy choices of the elec-
torate’s democratically chosen representatives for no better reason than the 
claim that the powers of Congress must have meaningful internal limits.  
To avoid that danger, constitutional lawyers must rethink the orthodox 
view that the internal-limits canon is correct.  And as part of the effort to 
prompt constitutional lawyers to rethink a settled idea, it is important to 
show that key sources of authority that people think support that idea—like 
Marshall’s dictum in Gibbons—actually do nothing of the kind. 
To be sure, the idea that the Congress lacks a police power does not rest 
on Marshall’s dictum alone.  It rests also on a traditional set of textual, 
structural, and originalist arguments.  But the authority of the great Chief 
Justice matters in the shaping of constitutional intuitions.  When lawyers 
hear the traditional arguments in favor of the internal-limits canon, the 
sense that Marshall articulated that canon as a plain proposition of constitu-
tional law makes it easier for them to assume that the conclusion is correct 
 
 15 Again, my perspective on this point departs from settled orthodoxy, and I do not pretend to have 
established it in the preceding paragraphs.  Readers who want to decide whether I might be right 
should read the full argument where I have offered it.  See Primus, supra note 11. 
 16 See United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 613, 617–19 (2000) (reasoning that the Commerce 
Clause must not be construed in a way that would permit Congress to exercise a police power); 
United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 564 (1995) (reasoning that upholding the Gun-Free School 
Zones Act would be tantamount to recognizing a general police power in Congress). 
 17 See Nat'l Fed'n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 2566, 2608 (2012) (upholding the Patient 
Protection and Affordable Care Act of 2010 as being within Congress’s power to tax but not an 
appropriate exercise of power under the Commerce Clause). 
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and perhaps accordingly to overlook the weaknesses of the arguments that 
supposedly make the canon correct.  That is why the Supreme Court from 
Lopez to Bond has quoted the Gibbons dictum, after all: to mobilize Mar-
shall’s authority in support of the internal-limits canon.18  So to dislodge 
the prevailing conviction that the powers of Congress cannot be tantamount 
to general legislative authority, it is important to show that Marshall said 
nothing of the kind. 
The first important way in which modern courts and scholars misread 
Marshall’s dictum is shockingly basic: they mistake which enumeration 
Marshall was discussing.  When modern courts quote Marshall as saying 
that the enumeration presupposes something unenumerated, they proceed 
as if the enumeration Marshall had in mind is the enumeration of congres-
sional powers in the eighteen clauses of Article I, Section 8—or, more 
broadly, the enumeration in that Section combined with the many other 
constitutional clauses specifying powers of Congress.  On that understand-
ing, to say that the enumeration presupposes something not enumerated is 
to say that the Constitution’s overall catalog of particular congressional 
powers indicates a constitutional purpose to deny Congress the ability to 
pass some laws it could pass if it enjoyed a general police power.19  But 
Marshall was not saying that.  Indeed, he could not possibly have been say-
ing that, because Marshall was not talking about the Constitution’s overall 
enumeration of congressional powers at all.  He was talking only about a 
more limited enumeration, one that occurs inside of one particular clause: 
Article I, Section 8, clause iii, which deals with congressional power over 
commerce. 
The Commerce Clause states that Congress has power to regulate 
“Commerce with foreign Nations, and among the several States, and with 
the Indian Tribes.”20  Marshall read that language as an enumeration—that 
is, a list21—of three kinds of commerce to which federal power extends.  
That enumeration, Marshall wrote, “presupposes something not enumerat-
 
 18 See supra notes 6–7 and accompanying text (identifying language in contemporary Supreme 
Court decisions which quote the dictum in Gibbons to address the outer limit of Congress’s enu-
merated powers). 
 19 See, e.g., Bond v. United States, 134 S. Ct. 2077, 2086 (2014) (construing the Constitution as 
conferring upon Congress less than a general police power); United States v. Kebodeaux, 133 S. 
Ct. 2496, 2507 (2013) (Roberts, C.J., concurring) (emphasizing that Congress does not have a 
federal police power); Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. at 2577 (insisting that Congress’s enumerated powers 
are not a general authority to perform all the conceivable functions of government). 
 20 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3. 
 21 Strictly speaking, an “enumeration” assigns numbers to things on a list.  In that sense, neither the 
Commerce Clause nor Section 8 overall actually “enumerates” the powers of Congress.  But con-
stitutional discourse uses the term “enumerate” in this context to refer to a list of separately spec-
ified powers, whether or not the items on the list are given numbers. 
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ed.”22  To be more specific, Marshall read the Commerce Clause to presup-
pose a fourth kind of commerce, namely intrastate commerce, that was not 
within the power conferred.23  But Marshall did not say that every enumera-
tion presupposes something not enumerated.  In particular, he did not say 
that the enumeration of Congress’s powers in the eighteen clauses of Sec-
tion 8 (or in those eighteen clauses plus the clauses outside Section 8 in 
which the Constitution specifies powers of Congress24) presupposes some-
thing not enumerated.  He said only that the enumeration in Clause iii had 
such a presupposition. 
It is, moreover, a good thing that Marshall did not make the broader 
statement that every enumeration presupposes something not enumerated.  
Had he done so, he would have professed a clear falsehood.  Different 
enumerations are different from one another: some enumerations presup-
pose things not enumerated, and some enumerations are exhaustive.  When 
I enumerate the days of the week, I name all seven.  When I offer my kids 
chocolate, vanilla, or strawberry ice cream, I might or might not have 
named all the flavors in the freezer.  And when a priest blesses his congre-
gation in the name of the Father, the Son, and the Holy Spirit, he does not 
imply the existence of some fourth branch of the deity whose blessing is 
withheld.  In short, it is not the case that enumerations generally presup-
pose things not enumerated.  Some do, and some do not.25 
One might think that Marshall’s exclusion of intrastate commerce from 
the commerce power does mean that Congress’s powers are, collectively, 
less than a general police power, not because all enumerations presuppose 
things not enumerated but simply because Marshall’s dictum identified 
something that Congress’s enumerated powers do not reach: intrastate 
commerce.  But that thought would be mistaken, in part because Marshall’s 
Gibbons dictum did not purport to exempt intrastate commerce from con-
gressional regulation.  Marshall wrote that Congress could not regulate 
purely intrastate commerce with its commerce power.  Nothing in his anal-
ysis, however, suggested that Congress could not regulate intrastate com-
 
 22 Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1, 195 (1824). 
 23 See id. at 197–98 (stating that the states have the power to regulate commerce within their re-
spective jurisdictions). 
 24 See Primus, supra note 11, at 581 n.14 (describing the Constitution as containing forty-three 
clauses conferring power on Congress, only eighteen of which are in Article I, Section 8). 
 25 For other illustrations of enumerations that do not exclude anything, see Primus, supra note 11, 
at 637–38 (giving further illustrations).  For a discussion of the reasons for which an authoritative 
body might write an enumeration of powers that does not exclude anything, see Richard Primus, 
Why Enumeration Matters, 115 MICH. L. REV. 1, 27–29 (2016). 
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merce with several of its other enumerated powers.26  On the contrary, 
Congress could regulate intrastate commerce with its taxing power, its pa-
tent power, its bankruptcy power, its money power—even with its power to 
do all things necessary and proper for carrying into execution the various 
powers vested in the federal government.27  In short, Marshall’s articulated 
limitation on the commerce power may not really have been a limit on the 
overall powers of Congress at all.28 
That fact should not be surprising if one thinks about Marshall’s more 
general attitude in Gibbons toward the project of interpreting the Constitu-
tion’s grants of power to Congress.  After all, to read the Gibbons dictum 
as keenly interested in placing a limit on federal legislative power is to 
place that passage in significant tension with the overall attitude toward 
Congress that Marshall articulated in Gibbons.  Shortly before embarking 
on his explication of the Commerce Clause in Gibbons, Marshall affirma-
tively rejected the idea that Congress’s enumerated powers should be con-
strued “strictly.”29  To be sure, Marshall wrote, Congress should not be 
deemed to have powers that could not fairly be read into the language of 
the Constitution.  But in cases where the Constitution’s language does not 
make clear whether something is within the scope of congressional power, 
Marshall warned against artificially constrained readings that, he warned, 
could “cripple the government.”30  In his opinion’s last paragraph, Marshall 
argued against—ridiculed, really—the very premise that Congress’s enu-
merated powers should be narrowly construed.  It was surely true, he wrote, 
that “[p]owerful and ingenious minds” bent on limiting the federal gov-
ernment could manufacture “refined and metaphysical” arguments to sup-
port narrow readings of Congress’s enumerated powers.31  But to do so, he 
continued, would badly mistake the American constitutional enterprise and 
leave the Constitution itself “totally unfit for use.”32  In light of that atti-
tude, to give Marshall’s construction of the Commerce Clause in Gibbons a 
significantly more restrictive interpretation than anything he meant by it 
would be particularly dissonant.  And to read his construction of that 
Clause in a way that need not limit the regulatory projects Congress might 
 
 26 See infra Part I.C.3 (explaining that Marshall’s conclusion that the Commerce Clause did not 
authorize Congress to regulate purely intrastate commerce did not foreclose Congress from using 
some other congressional power to regulate that commerce). 
 27 See infra Part I.C.3. 
 28 See infra Part I.C.3 (arguing that the Gibbons dictum takes no position on the limits of Con-
gress’s powers taken as a whole). 
 29 Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1, 187–88 (1824). 
 30 Id. at 188. 
 31 Id. at 222. 
 32 Id. 
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pursue simply brings that piece of his opinion in line with his more general 
approach. 
But if Marshall’s dictum meant little as a limitation on what regulatory 
projects Congress could pursue, it meant a great deal for the permissible 
scope of state and local regulation.  Then as now, Congress might care little 
whether a given federal law is an exercise of the commerce power or an 
exercise of power under the Necessary and Proper Clause.  But in 1824, 
states cared a lot about the difference.  The reason why went to an issue of 
constitutional preemption.  According to many leading lawyers early in the 
nineteenth century—Marshall probably among them—Congress’s power to 
regulate commerce was exclusive of any parallel power in the state gov-
ernments.33  If some subject matter fell within the scope of Clause iii, states 
were absolutely barred from regulating it, whether or not Congress had act-
ed in that area.34  An overly broad construction of the commerce power 
might accordingly wreck a lot of necessary local regulation. 
Suppose, for example, that the town butcher or the local roads were 
regulated by state and local authorities—as they indeed were.35  Even in 
1824, constitutional lawyers understood that the local butcher and the local 
roads had connections to interstate commerce.36  If the federal commerce 
power were construed to reach them, and if the federal commerce power 
were exclusive, then local authorities would be unable to regulate the 
butcher or the roads.  That would leave the butcher and the roads complete-
ly unregulated.  Congress was not in the business of regulating local butch-
ers, after all.  So if the Commerce Clause was a grant of exclusive power to 
Congress, it was essential that the commerce power be interpreted as not 
reaching matters in need of local regulation. 
But this rubric supplied no reason to prevent Congress from regulating 
local commerce with tools that wouldn’t preempt broad swaths of local 
regulation in areas for which Congress was not going to assume responsi-
bility.  The preemption problem was associated with the commerce power, 
 
 33 See Id. at 209 (describing the exclusive-power contention as having “great force”). 
 34 See, e.g., Passenger Cases, 48 U.S. (7 How.) 283, 391–92 (1849) (plurality opinion) (striking 
down state laws taxing alien passenger landings as unconstitutional encroachments on the federal 
power to regulate commerce); Gibbons, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) at 9–10 (summarizing Representative 
Daniel Webster’s argument that the commerce power lay exclusively with Congress). 
 35 See WILLIAM J. NOVAK, THE PEOPLE’S WELFARE: LAW AND REGULATION IN NINETEENTH-
CENTURY AMERICA 95–100, 115–31 (1996) (describing early state and local laws regulating 
butchers and local roads). 
 36 In Gibbons itself, even the lawyers defending the position hostile to federal power acknowledged 
this point.  See Gibbons, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) at 65 (describing “a vast range of State legislation, 
such as turnpike roads, toll bridges, exclusive rights to run stage wagons, auction licenses, li-
censes to retailers,” and admitting that such laws “must necessarily affect, to a great extent, the 
foreign trade, and . . . trade and commerce with other States”). 
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not with all federal powers.37  If Congress regulated local commerce 
through the exercise of powers other than the commerce power, the 
preemption problem need not arise.  Given that understanding, it made all 
the sense in the world for Marshall to articulate a limit on the commerce 
power in particular, even if there were no similar limit on the powers of 
Congress taken as a whole. 
Gibbons was a sensible case for articulating that limit.  It was the Su-
preme Court’s first Commerce Clause case, and the big issue it presented 
was whether the commerce power lay exclusively with Congress.  Not for 
the first time in his career, the Chief Justice got where he wanted to go by 
manipulating the meaning of a statute.38  Instead of deciding whether the 
power to regulate commerce was exclusive in Congress or held concurrent-
ly by Congress and state governments, Marshall pretended that a federal 
statute had already spoken to the specific matter in contention between the 
parties.39  Modern readers of Gibbons tend to focus on the part of the case 
that deals with the federal statute, because we are accustomed to thinking 
of Commerce Clause cases as primarily about the validity of Acts of Con-
gress.  But in 1824, the pressing issue was what to make of the possibility 
of exclusive federal power over commerce in a world where everyone al-
ready understood that the local road connected eventually to the highway 
and the sea.  Marshall’s statement that the enumeration presupposed some-
thing not enumerated was a response to that concern.  It tempered the po-
tential impact of exclusive federal power under the Commerce Clause by 
declaring that local commercial regulation would not be automatically 
preempted.  And it did so without imposing impediments to federal regula-
tions of local commerce that Congress might enact under powers other than 
those in Clause iii. 
Modern constitutional law misunderstands the Gibbons dictum partly 
because it does not have the problem to which Marshall’s interpretation of 
the Commerce Clause was a solution.  For more than a hundred years, pre-
vailing doctrine has rejected the idea that federal power over commerce is 
exclusive.  Instead, constitutional law regards the states and Congress as 
 
 37 This is not to say that the commerce power was the only power that might be preemptive.  See, 
e.g., Livingston v. Van Ingen, 9 Johns. 507, 560 (N.Y. 1812) (Yates, J.) (raising the possibility 
that the patent power was preemptive). 
 38 See, e.g., Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 175–76 (1803) (reading Section 13 of the 
Judiciary Act of 1789 as purporting to enlarge the original jurisdiction of the Supreme Court). 
 39 See Gibbons, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) at 2 (reading the Act of February 18, 1793, entitled “An Act for 
enrolling and licensing ships or vessels to be employed in the coasting trade and fisheries, and 
for regulating the same,” as decisive (quoting 1 Stat. 305 (1793)).  For the analysis indicating 
that Marshall’s statutory rationale was a pretense, see infra Part II.C, which explains that the fed-
eral license issue was used to avoid ruling on the deep and divisive issue of the Commerce 
Clause. 
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exercising their regulatory power over commercial affairs concurrently, 
with Congress prevailing in cases of conflict.40  That model has freed the 
courts to abandon the always-artificial rules distinguishing interstate from 
intrastate commerce.  Without the fear that a broad commerce power will 
preempt necessary local regulation, Congress can be given greater latitude 
to regulate the national economy as it sees fit.41  To be sure, that develop-
ment has brought a different set of concerns to the forefront of commerce 
doctrine.  In our era, the leading question about the commerce power is not 
whether state law will be preempted even in the absence of federal regula-
tion.  It is whether federal regulation is limited by anything other than af-
firmative constitutional prohibitions like those in the Bill of Rights.42  With 
that question in mind, and having forgotten that Marshall was worried 
about something else, courts have misappropriated the Gibbons dictum and 
used it to mean something Marshall did not mean: that the Constitution’s 
overall enumeration of congressional powers indicates that those powers, 
as a whole, are less than a general police power. 
In Part I of this Article, I explain why the Gibbons dictum did not mean 
what modern courts use it to mean.  When Marshall wrote that the enumer-
ation presupposes something not enumerated, he was not making a state-
ment about the overall set of congressional powers, and we cannot infer 
anything about that overall set from the narrower statement that he was in 
fact making.  In Part II, I explain what the Gibbons dictum really did mean.  
Marshall’s formulation was significant not as a limitation on Congress but 
as reassurance about the prima facie regulatory power of states.  That reas-
surance was important because many lawyers at the time saw the com-
merce power as divesting states of local regulatory authority.  Once consti-
tutional doctrine established the authority of states to regulate concurrently 
with federal commerce legislation, however, preserving local regulation no 
 
 40 See Lawrence Lessig, Translating Federalism: United States v. Lopez, 1995 SUP. CT. REV. 125, 
159–66 (charting the rise of this concurrent-jurisdiction model). 
 41 See id. at 166–67 (describing the link between the acceptance of concurrent jurisdiction and the 
rise of expansive modern commerce doctrine). 
 42 See, e.g., Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 2566, 2647 (2012) (criticizing the 
Government for being unable to provide any limiting principle to Congress’s commerce power); 
United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 567–68 (1995) (insisting that congressional power must be 
internally limited).  Another important question in our times—one that is perhaps more practical-
ly consequential if less symbolically salient—is how expansively federal legislation under the 
Commerce Clause will be construed to preempt state law with which it does not directly conflict.  
See Theodore W. Ruger, Preempting the People: The Judicial Role in Regulatory Concurrency 
and Its Implications for Popular Lawmaking, 81 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 1029 (2006) (pointing out 
that the degree to which federal legislation narrows state policymaking autonomy depends heavi-
ly on how courts approach issues of field-preemption).  That second question has an obvious 
similarity to the leading question at the time of Gibbons, but it is also crucially different, because 
it concerns preemption when Congress has in fact legislated, rather than preemption even in the 
absence of federal legislation. 
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longer required a distinction between local commerce and the commerce 
regulable under Clause iii.  So the Gibbons dictum disappeared from Amer-
ican law—until Lopez brought it back to mean something else. 
I.  GIBBONS AND THE POWER OF CONGRESS 
A.  The Rivalry 
The case that became Gibbons v. Ogden arose at the intersection of two 
rivalries, one between men and one among states.  More was at stake for 
the early Republic in the state rivalry than in the personal one.  But within 
its own sphere, the personal rivalry between Thomas Gibbons and Aaron 
Ogden was plenty big enough. 
Ogden was born in Elizabeth, New Jersey, in 1756.43  He served with 
distinction in the Revolutionary War, entered the practice of law, and be-
came a leading member of the Federalist Party in his home state.44  From 
1801 to 1803, he served as a United States Senator and, from 1812 to 1813, 
as Governor of New Jersey.45 
Among his other pursuits, Ogden was in the steamboat business.  In 
particular, he was interested in operating steamboats on the portion of the 
Hudson River that lies near New York City.46  But under the law of New 
York, a man named John Livingston enjoyed an exclusive right to operate 
steamboats on the relevant part of the Hudson.47  So in 1815, Ogden bought 
 
 43 Ogden, Aaron, 2 NEW JERSEY BIOGRAPHICAL DICTIONARY 525–26 (Caryn Hannan et al. eds., 
2008–2009 ed. 2008). 
 44 See id.; see also MAURICE G. BAXTER, THE STEAMBOAT MONOPOLY: GIBBONS V. OGDEN, 1824 
at 25 (1972) (describing Ogden as a “veteran of the Revolution, and a Federalist lawyer-
politician”). 
 45 See NEW JERSEY BIOGRAPHICAL DICTIONARY, supra note 43, at 525–26; see also Ogden, Aaron 
(1756-1839), BIOGRAPHICAL DIRECTORY OF THE U.S. CONGRESS, http://bioguide.congress.gov/ 
  scripts/biodisplay.pl?index=o000041, (last visited Mar. 8, 2017). 
 46 See sources cited supra note 45. 
 47 Livingston enjoyed that right as the assignee of a franchise—in later terms, a monopoly—that the 
State of New York had originally awarded to the business partnership of Robert Fulton and Rob-
ert Livingston, John Livingston’s elder brother.  See infra notes 163–166 and accompanying text 
(recounting the factual background of Livingston v. Van Ingen, 9 Johns. 507, 560 (N.Y. 1812)).  
Under the original grant, Fulton and the elder Livingston had the exclusive right to operate 
steamboats at all places within the territorial waters of New York.  They subsequently assigned 
the portion of their exclusive right that applied to the waters between New York City and New 
Jersey to the younger Livingston, who granted a license to Ogden.  See Livingston v. Ogden, 4 
Johns. Ch. 48, 48–49 (N.Y. Ch. 1819). 
  The connection between Fulton and Ogden would have at least two unfortunate consequences for 
Fulton.  First, Ogden’s interests in his litigation against Thomas Gibbons would prompt him to 
deny, vigorously, that Fulton was the inventor of the steamboat.  See BAXTER, supra note 44, at 
30 (describing how Ogden’s attorney attacked Fulton’s claims that he invented the steamboat).  
If Fulton had been the inventor, then a plausible claim would have arisen that New York had no 
authority to grant him an exclusive right to operate steamboats, because the Constitution assigns 
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from Livingston a license to operate a ferry between Elizabethtown Point, 
on the New Jersey side of the Hudson, and New York City.48 
The land in Elizabethtown where Ogden’s ferry docked was owned by a 
wealthy businessman named Thomas Gibbons.49  For a time, Gibbons and 
Ogden operated their businesses to mutual advantage.50  But friction even-
tually arose.  And unfortunately, matters got personal. 
Gibbons was the scion of a wealthy Georgia family.51  He had served as 
Mayor of Savannah before resettling in New Jersey, and he retained sub-
stantial landholdings in Georgia and elsewhere in the South.52  The ferry 
landing in Elizabethtown was a small part of his total wealth.  He had 
placed that property in trust for his daughter.53  But Gibbons’s detested son-
in-law, John M. Trumbull, wanted the land for himself, and without de-
lay.54  Being the sort of character who gets described as a detested son-in-
law, Trumbull made common cause with Gibbons’s estranged wife Ann 
and encouraged her to sue Gibbons for divorce, something that would have 
opened up Gibbons’s wealth for division on terms more favorable to Trum-
bull than would have been the case if his father-in-law were able to dispose 
of his assets freely.55  No divorce was ultimately recorded, but Ann Gib-
 
the power to give inventors exclusive rights to their inventions to Congress rather than to state 
legislatures.  See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8 (granting Congress the power “[t]o promote the 
Progress of Science and useful arts, by securing for limited Times to . . . Inventors the exclusive 
Right to their respective . . . Discoveries”).  As a result, the official law reporters of both New 
York and the United States contain passages roundly declaring that Fulton was certainly not the 
inventor but merely an appropriator of technology invented by others.  See, e.g., Livingston v. 
Van Ingen, 9 Johns. 507, 558–59 (N.Y. 1812) (Yates, J.) (finding that John Fitch had previously 
been deemed the inventor of the steamboat, and that Livingston and, subsequently, Fulton were 
merely “possessor[s] of a mode of applying the steam engine”).  But this public diminishment of 
Fulton might not have been the worst thing for him to flow from the affair.  The worst thing, it 
would seem, was his death.  In February 1815, Fulton crossed the frozen Hudson on foot with 
Thomas Addis Emmet, one of Ogden’s lawyers.  Emmet fell through the ice, and Fulton pulled 
him out.  Emmet recovered; Fulton, for his good deed, fell ill and died.  See BAXTER, supra note 
44, at 31; HERBERT A. JOHNSON, GIBBONS V. OGDEN: JOHN MARSHALL, STEAMBOATS, AND THE 
COMMERCE CLAUSE 86–87 (2010). 
 48 BAXTER, supra note 44, at 30–31. 
 49 Letter from Joseph Trumbull to D.W. Coit (Nov. 8, 1813) (on file with author).  
 50 BAXTER, supra note 44, at 30–31; see also THOMAS H. COX, GIBBONS V. OGDEN, LAW, AND 
SOCIETY IN THE EARLY REPUBLIC 72 (2009) (describing Gibbons and Ogden’s relationship as 
“cordial”).  At one point before Ogden purchased the license from John Livingston, Livingston 
sued both Gibbons and Ogden for violating his exclusive right collusively.  See Ogden, 4 Johns. 
Ch. at 48–50. 
 51 See BAXTER, supra note 44, at 31 (describing the successful businesses Gibbons owned). 
 52 See id.; see also EDWARD T. PRICE, DIVIDING THE LAND: EARLY AMERICAN BEGINNINGS OF 
OUR PRIVATE PROPERTY MOSAIC 180–81 (1995). 
 53 See COX, supra note 50, at 73. 
 54 Id. at 73–74. 
 55 Id. at 93–94. 
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bons considered the option seriously enough to seek legal advice.  And one 
of the attorneys she consulted was Aaron Ogden.56 
Nobody knows why Ogden agreed to counsel Ann Gibbons.  Perhaps 
he figured that a Gibbons divorce was in his interests, because it might pry 
the ferry-landing property out of the hands of a difficult business associate.  
But whatever his motives, Ogden’s decision to become involved in the 
Gibbons family drama had seriously adverse consequences for his steam-
boat business.  As Ogden probably should have foreseen, Thomas Gibbons 
did not take kindly to Ogden’s counseling Ann Gibbons about the possibil-
ity of divorce.  Gibbons became incensed, and he expressed his ire in at 
least two different ways, each one appropriate to a different aspect of 
Thomas Gibbons.  Being, as noted earlier, the scion of a wealthy Georgia 
family, Gibbons challenged Ogden to a duel.57  Being also a New Jersey 
businessman, Gibbons decided to crush Ogden commercially.  He began to 
operate a rival steamboat line between Elizabethtown and New York.58 
Gibbons knew that New York law prohibited operating such a rival 
line.  Nobody was permitted to use a steamboat between Elizabethtown and 
New York City without permission from Livingston, and Livingston had 
given a license to Ogden and not to Gibbons.59  But Gibbons had a legal 
theory.  His steamboats were licensed under federal authority to participate 
in what was then called the coasting trade—that is, trade by water between 
points within the United States.60  Federal authority, he reasoned, is superi-
or to state authority.  So if the federal government had authorized the oper-
ation of Gibbons’s steamboats, New York would be powerless to stop him, 
and Gibbons could crush Ogden’s business as he liked.61 
Ogden didn’t like it much.  He sued to enforce his exclusive permission 
under New York law, and the New York courts decided in his favor.62  But 
Gibbons took the case to the Supreme Court of the United States, which re-
versed the decision below.63  In a famous opinion, Chief Justice John Mar-
shall agreed with Gibbons that his vessels, being licensed under federal au-
thority to participate in the coasting trade, could not be barred by mere state 
 
 56 See id. at 94 (describing steps taken by Ann Gibbons to secure a divorce from her husband). 
 57 The duel was not actually fought, but the challenge became the subject of libel litigation between 
the two men, litigation in which Gibbons reportedly ranted at the jury for several hours about 
Ogden’s despicable behavior.  The jury ultimately returned a verdict for Ogden, which probably 
only heighted Gibbons’s antipathy for his rival.  See COX, supra note 50, at 122–23 (reporting 
that the $5,000 jury verdict against Gibbons was not a surprise). 
 58 See BAXTER, supra note 44, at 32. 
 59 See id. at 31 (noting that Ogden held the license). 
 60 See COX, supra note 50, at 112. 
 61 See Ogden v. Gibbons, 4 Johns. Ch. 150, 156–57 (N.Y. Ch. 1819) (explaining the federal licens-
ing scheme that Gibbons claimed created his right to operate his steamboat along the Hudson). 
 62 See Gibbons v. Ogden, 17 Johns. 488, 509 (N.Y. 1820). 
 63 See Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1, 239 (1824). 
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law from navigating the waters of New York.64  Congress could make rules 
for the coasting trade under its power to regulate commerce among the sev-
eral states; Gibbons’s steamboats operated under the authority of those 
rules; the authority of those rules was superior to any law that New York 
could make.65 
In Part II, I will explain that the coasting-trade rationale was a ruse.66  
But for now, we can accept the decision at face value, because what is im-
portant for present purposes is not the Court’s ruling about the coasting 
trade but the more general analysis that Marshall offered about the scope of 
Article I’s Commerce Clause.  That analysis was the first systematic treat-
ment of the commerce power in any Supreme Court opinion.67  And as the 
next two sections demonstrate, one of the central features of that analysis—
Marshall’s pithy observation that the enumeration presupposes something 
not enumerated—has been systematically misunderstood. 
B.  The Dictum 
When Gibbons was argued at the Supreme Court, the relationship of the 
federal commerce power to commerce occurring within the boundaries of a 
single state was a matter of first impression.  Ogden’s attorneys argued that 
the commerce power did not reach intrastate commerce.68  But they did not 
make their case on the ground that commercial regulation in one state had 
nothing to do with commerce more broadly.  On the contrary, Ogden’s at-
torneys acknowledged that the regulation of commerce within a given state 
greatly affected commerce with other states and with foreign nations.  That 
was a basic economic fact, even in 1824.  Indeed, the Court reporter sum-
 
 64 Id. at 211–13. 
 65 Id. 
 66 The basic infirmity in the coasting-trade rationale, as several of the participants in the litigation 
well understood, was that federal coasting licenses did not purport to authorize their bearers to 
operate vessels in contravention of local law.  They purported only to exempt their bearers from 
a specified set of burdens—principally taxes and user-fees for ports—that federal law imposed 
on vessels not so licensed.  See infra Part II.C.3.  Marshall surely understood the weakness in the 
argument; not for the first time, the great Chief Justice read a technical legal authority tenden-
tiously in the service of what he understood to be a larger constitutional cause.  See infra Part 
II.C.3; see also, e.g., Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 175–76 (1803) (reading Sec-
tion 13 of the Judiciary Act of 1789 as purporting to enlarge the original jurisdiction of the Su-
preme Court). 
 67 Opinions in a few prior cases had made reference to the commerce power.  See, e.g., Cohens v. 
Virginia, 19 U.S. (6 Wheat.) 264, 382 (1821) (describing commerce as one of the powers confid-
ed in the federal government); McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 407 (1819) (re-
counting commerce as one of the enumerated powers of government).  But no decision prior to 
Gibbons had turned on a Commerce Clause issue, and no opinion had offered a systematic inves-
tigation of the Clause. 
 68 See, e.g., Gibbons, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) at 64–65 (recounting argument by counsel that commerce 
“among the several states” did not include commerce carried on within the limits of one State). 
Mar. 2017] THE GIBBONS FALLACY 583 
 
marized Ogden’s statement of this point in terms that might have been per-
fectly at home in a post-1937 Supreme Court opinion, describing 
a vast range of State legislation, such as turnpike roads, toll bridges, exclusive 
rights to run stage wagons, auction licenses, licenses to retailers, and to hawk-
ers and ped[d]lers, ferries over navigable rivers and lakes, and all exclusive 
rights to carry goods and passengers, by land or water.  All such laws must 
necessarily affect, to a great extent, the foreign trade, and that between the 
States, as well as the trade among the citizens of the same State . . . . [T]hese 
laws do thus affect trade and commerce with other States . . . .69 
In short, Ogden’s counsel frankly admitted that local commerce and inter-
state commerce were intertwined as a matter of fact.  Of course navigation 
on the Hudson River had economic effects on other states, and of course 
New York’s rules about who could operate steamboats would affect com-
merce beyond New York.  But as a matter of law, Ogden maintained, it 
would be a mistake to treat these facts of economic interconnectedness as 
sufficient reason for construing the federal commerce power as reaching a 
state’s internal commercial affairs.70 
Representing Gibbons, no less a lawyer than Daniel Webster71 staked 
out a more nationalist position.  The Framers, he argued, went to Philadel-
phia to do away with the state-versus-state economic squabbling that exist-
ed under the Articles of Confederation.72  They saw the Balkanization of 
commerce by protectionist states as a major vice of government under that 
system, and they sought to solve the problem by centralizing commercial 
regulation.73  The Constitution that the Framers drafted accordingly regard-
ed domestic commerce as one integrated system to be regulated by Con-
 
 69 Id. at 65. 
 70 See id. (“But, although these laws do thus affect trade and commerce with other States, Congress 
cannot interfere, as its power does not reach the regulation of internal trade, which resides exclu-
sively in the States.”). 
 71 Webster was of course one of the leading political orators of his time; the nineteenth-century 
Senate’s reputation as a forum for great debates was founded substantially on his participation, 
along with that of contemporaries like John Calhoun and Henry Clay.  See, e.g., ROBERT A. 
FERGUSON, LAW AND LETTERS IN AMERICAN CULTURE 209, 221–40 (1984) (describing the sen-
atorial culture of debate that was at the time central to American constitutional discourse).  When 
Gibbons was argued, Webster was playing a key role in congressional debate on a leading consti-
tutional issue of the day within the legislative branch, which concerned the extent of Congress’s 
authority to build roads, dams, canals, and other “internal improvements” within the territorial 
limits of nonconsenting states.  See Alison L. LaCroix, The Interbellum Constitution: Federalism 
in the Long Founding Moment, 67 STAN. L. REV. 397, 409–39 (2015) (describing the internal 
improvements debate). 
 72 Gibbons, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) at 14 (arguing that the commerce of the states was to henceforth be 
conducted as a unit). 
 73 See, e.g., JAMES MADISON, VICES OF THE POLITICAL SYSTEM OF THE UNITED STATES (1787), 
reprinted in 9 THE PAPERS OF JAMES MADISON 346 (Robert A. Rutland & William M.E. Rachal 
eds., 1975) (describing a calamitous “want of concert in matters where common interest requires 
it . . . [as] strongly illustrated in the state of our commercial affairs”). 
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gress.74  On this vision, the statement “Congress shall have power 
to . . . regulate commerce with foreign nations, and among the several 
states”75 was a way of saying “Congress shall have power to regulate both 
foreign and domestic commerce.” 
In his opinion for the Court, Chief Justice Marshall leaned toward the 
nationalist position.  He rejected as nonsensical the idea that Congress 
could not regulate commerce occurring within particular states.  After all, 
he wrote, commerce among the states must occur within their borders.76  A 
power to regulate commerce among the several states must therefore be a 
power to regulate commerce occurring within particular states.77  But Mar-
 
 74 Gibbons, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) at 14. 
 75 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 1, 3. 
 76 See Gibbons, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) at 194 (“Commerce among the States, cannot stop at the exter-
nal boundary line of each State, but may be introduced into the interior.”). 
 77 See id.  On this point, Marshall’s argument seems unassailable.  So much so, in fact, that it is 
worth wondering whether the other side can really have been arguing the proposition that Mar-
shall refutes.  Was Ogden really asking the Supreme Court of the United States to rule that the 
commerce power had no force anywhere in New York, or New Jersey, or Virginia, or within any 
other state?  That it operates only in, say, the District of Columbia, and other federal territories, 
and beyond the international boundary of the United States?  It hardly seems plausible, and cer-
tainly not if one remembers that giving the federal government power to regulate commerce was 
one of the principal objectives of the movement to replace the Articles of Confederation with a 
new Constitution.  See supra notes 72–74 and accompanying text (describing the Founders’ pro-
ject of empowering the national government to regulate commerce). 
 
  There is a temptation to shake one’s head and say, “Yes, it seems odd that anyone could have 
construed the Commerce Clause so narrowly—but I guess some people did.  After all, we do 
know that our modern construction of that Clause is much broader than the original construction.  
So maybe what seems like a bizarrely narrow reading wasn’t really so strange given the under-
standing of the time.”  It is of course prudent to remember that our own assumptions may differ 
from those of a different generation.  But in this case, there is something else that helps explain 
why Ogden’s attorneys thought it reasonable to argue that their client’s exclusive privilege was a 
matter of internal commerce that could not be reached by Congress. 
 
  Today, the state boundary between New York and New Jersey runs down the middle of the Hud-
son River.  When we imagine a ferry trip from Elizabethtown to New York City, we imagine a 
core case of interstate travel, half in one state and half in another.  Within that framing, New 
York’s grant of an exclusive right to operate steamboats within its borders presents itself as a 
right applicable over half of the journey, and the claim that a license granted by Congress cannot 
override that right is comprehensible only as a claim that, as soon as the ferry crosses beyond the 
state line and into New York’s waters, the force of the commerce power ceases—even though the 
trip is an interstate trip, even though one moment earlier the boat had straddled a state line.  That 
makes Ogden’s claim seem extravagant and unworkable.  But when Gibbons v. Ogden arose, 
New York claimed the entirety of the Hudson River as its own territory, all the way to the New 
Jersey shore.  See Act of Apr. 6, 1808, ch. 135, 1808 N.Y. Laws 313 (declaring that the “river 
Hudson . . . and the bay between it and Long-Island” is New York’s “rightful territory”).  From 
New York’s perspective, therefore, there was nothing interstate about ferry traffic on the Hudson.  
The passengers moved interstate in leaving the New Jersey shore and boarding the ferry, but the 
ferry itself moved only within the territorial limits of New York.  On that framing, Ogden’s claim 
that Livingston’s exclusive grant was a regulation of New York’s internal commerce only is con-
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shall did not endorse the Gibbons-Webster view in unqualified terms.  Hav-
ing asserted that the commerce power was operative within the territorial 
limits of states, Marshall also acknowledged a limit.  Clause iii did not 
bear, he wrote, on commerce that was entirely contained within a single 
state.78  To support this conclusion, Marshall pointed to the text of the 
Commerce Clause, which specifies that Congress has power to regulate 
commerce “with foreign Nations, and among the several States, and with 
the Indian Tribes.”79  Marshall parsed that language as follows: 
[T]he enumeration of the particular classes of commerce, to which the power 
was to be extended, would not have been made, had the intention been to ex-
tend the power to every description. The enumeration presupposes something 
not enumerated; and that something, if we regard the language or the subject of 
the sentence, must be the exclusively internal commerce of a State.80 
In other words, the Clause enumerates three “particular classes of com-
merce.”81  They are (1) commerce with foreign nations, (2) commerce 
among the several states, and (3) commerce with the Indian tribes.82  By 
separately listing those three, Marshall argued, the Clause indicates the ex-
istence of some other kind of commerce not included in any of the three 
classes listed.83  That is the thought that Marshall pithily captured with the 
 
siderably less bizarre.  (Marshall’s opinion in Gibbons took no side on and indeed did not men-
tion this question, so the boundary dispute is invisible to modern readers of the decision). 
 78 Gibbons, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) at 194. 
 79 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3. 
 80 Gibbons, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) at 194–95 (emphasis added). 
 81 Id. at 194. 
 82 Id. at 193.  It is here worth repeating a point made earlier, supra note 21, about the meaning of 
the word “enumeration.”  Strictly speaking, the Commerce Clause does not enumerate three clas-
ses of commerce.  On a literal understanding, “enumeration” involves counting, or the assign-
ment of numbers to things.  My sentence preceding this footnote enumerates the three classes of 
commerce—that is, it assigns them numbers.  The Commerce Clause does not.  But we need not 
detain ourselves long here on what might seem a trifling point.  Marshall used “enumeration” to 
mean something like “separate listing, in a way conducive to numbering,” and for present pur-
poses it will suffice to proceed on the understanding that that is what the word is being used to 
mean.  Note, too, that in constitutional law more broadly the term “enumerated powers” is often 
used as a synonym for “delegated powers,” whether the powers in question are expressly listed or 
not.  See Primus, supra note 11, at 588–90; see also Evan H. Caminker, “Appropriate” Means-
Ends Constraints on Section 5 Powers, 53 STAN. L. REV. 1127, 1135 (2001) (analyzing the gap 
between the expressly listed powers of Congress and the full set of congressional powers under 
the Constitution). 
 83 It bears emphasis that this reading was one for which Marshall argued, and which his opinion in 
Gibbons established as orthodox, rather than its having been the only available reading of the 
text.  After all, competent lawyers up until Gibbons also saw another available reading, one on 
which the language authorizing Congress “to regulate commerce with foreign nations, and 
among the several states, and with the Indian tribes” meant in essence “Congress has the power 
to regulate commerce, both foreign and domestic.”  See supra note 72 (noting that Webster’s ar-
gument in Gibbons read the Commerce Clause this way).  But as often happens, the judicially 
endorsed reading, once orthodox, came to seem to many constitutional lawyers as if it were ex-
plicitly required by the text itself.  See, e.g., A.L.A. Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States, 295 
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italicized words above: “The enumeration presupposes something not enu-
merated . . . .”84 
That expression was referenced three times in Lopez85 and has since be-
come a standard way of asserting the internal-limits canon.86  For ease of 
reference, I refer to that expression as the Gibbons dictum. 
C.  The Mistake 
Ever since United States v. Lopez, courts and commentators have quot-
ed the Gibbons dictum as support for the internal-limits canon—that is, as 
support for the proposition that the sum total of the powers of Congress 
must be less than general legislative authority.  And we are now in a posi-
tion to see why that use of the dictum is mistaken.  First, when Marshall 
wrote the Gibbons dictum, he was not saying anything about the sum total 
of the powers of Congress.  He was addressing only the commerce power.  
Second, the Gibbons dictum identified no actual limits on the regulatory 
power of Congress.  The dictum said something about a limit on the com-
merce power, but it left Congress perfectly free to use its other powers to 
regulate matters that the commerce power could not reach.  And indeed, it 
is clear under prevailing doctrine today—doctrine confirmed, rather than 
questioned, by Lopez and Sebelius—that everything the Gibbons dictum 
placed beyond the Commerce Clause is regulable by Congress. 
1.  The Gibbons Dictum and the Two Enumerations 
It may be useful here to belabor what should be obvious.  The enumera-
tion that Marshall addressed in the Gibbons dictum is the naming of three 
kinds of commerce in the Commerce Clause: commerce with foreign na-
tions, commerce among the states, and commerce with Indian tribes.  It is 
not the enumeration of congressional powers—the taxing power,87 the 
spending power,88 the money-borrowing power,89 the commerce power,90 
 
U.S. 495, 550 (1935) (speaking of “the distinction, which the commerce clause itself establishes, 
between commerce ‘among the several States’ and the internal concerns of a state.”).  The text of 
the Commerce Clause does establish that distinction if one reads that text as Marshall read it in 
Gibbons, of course.  But as Webster’s argument before the Court indicates, that was not the only 
way that the clause could be read. 
 84 Gibbons, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) at 195. 
 85 United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 553, 566–67 (1995). 
 86 See supra notes 6–8 (collecting post-Lopez citations of the Gibbons dictum). 
 87 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 1. 
 88 Id. 
 89 Id. art. I, § 8, cl. 2. 
 90 Id. art. I, § 8, cl. 3. 
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the naturalization power,91 the bankruptcy power,92 and so on—across the 
eighteen clauses of Article I, Section 8.  That is a different enumeration. 
So when Marshall said that the enumeration presupposes something not 
enumerated, he was saying, “the fact that the Commerce Clause lists three 
categories of commerce presupposes some commerce not falling within 
those three categories.”  He was not saying “The fact that the Constitution 
lists many powers of Congress, in many different clauses of which the 
Commerce Clause is only one, presupposes possible subjects of regulation 
not reachable with any of the powers named in those many clauses.”  In 
other words, he was not endorsing the internal-limits canon.93 
Whether the internal-limits canon is sound does not depend on whether 
Marshall announced it in Gibbons.  But it is worth being clear about what 
Marshall did and did not say.  Marshall’s Gibbons dictum makes no claim 
about what the enumeration of Congress’s powers across many different 
clauses of Constitution might presuppose.  It makes no such claim because 
it does not address that enumeration at all.  It addresses something else. 
This point is not subtle.  But as it happens, Marshall’s Gibbons dictum 
is used today to mean precisely what this simple point indicates it does not 
mean.  In Lopez,94 and in Sebelius,95 and in Bond,96 the invocations of the 
phrase “the enumeration presupposes something not enumerated” do not 
mean “the listing of three categories of commerce presupposes some other 
kind of commerce.”  They mean “The powers of Congress are enumerated, 
so there must be regulatory subjects that no power of Congress can reach.”  
Or, put more broadly, “The enumeration of Congress’s powers indicates 
that Congress has no general police power.”  But Marshall was not saying 
those things, and could not have been saying those things, because he was 
not even talking about the enumeration that is said to contain those implica-
tions.97 
 
 91 Id.art. I, § 8, cl. 4. 
 92 Id. 
 93 See supra note 3 and accompanying text (discussing the internal-limits canon). 
 94 United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 553, 566–67 (1995). 
 95 Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 2566, 2577 (2012). 
 96 Bond v. United States, 134 S. Ct. 2077, 2099 (2014). 
 97 In an earlier article on the subject of Congress’s enumerated powers, I argued that in principle an 
enumeration of powers might or might not be limiting, depending on contingent facts about that 
particular enumeration and the circumstances in which it is applied. Primus, supra note 11, at 
581.  In a commissioned response to my article, Kurt Lash agreed with that point as a general 
matter, acknowledging that an enumerated list might in practice be exhaustive rather than limit-
ing.  Lash, supra note 8, at 182.  But whether that is true of enumerations in general, Lash con-
tinued, is not the real issue when we are dealing with the enumeration of Congress’ powers.  The 
critical issue, Lash wrote, “is whether it is possible that the particular list of enumerated authori-
ties in the Constitution delegates all possible power.  Chief Justice John Marshall’s famous dic-
tum in Gibbons v. Ogden that ‘the enumeration presupposes something not enumerated’ was not 
about every possible enumeration, but about one particular enumeration.”  Id.  I agree, of course, 
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2.  The Gibbons Dictum and Expressio Unius 
Some readers may be tempted to argue that Marshall’s dictum supports 
the internal-limits canon even though Marshall was making a different 
point when he penned the words.  Yes, the intuition would run, it’s true: 
when Marshall wrote that the enumeration presupposed something not 
enumerated, he was talking about a different enumeration.  But perhaps 
Marshall was making a conceptual point, not a local one.  In saying that a 
certain enumeration presupposed something not enumerated, perhaps Mar-
shall was applying a more general truth about enumerations: that they pre-
suppose things not enumerated.  And if enumerations generally presuppose 
things not enumerated, then it really doesn’t matter which enumeration 
Marshall happened to be speaking about.  The powers of Congress are writ-
ten as an enumeration of specific authorizations, and that enumeration, too, 
presupposes something not enumerated, because enumerations do that. 
This train of thought treats the Gibbons dictum as if Marshall had said 
“It is a rule in legal interpretation that enumerations always presuppose 
things not enumerated,” rather than saying, “this enumeration, in particular, 
presupposes something not enumerated.”  But Marshall was not making the 
broader statement, and it would disserve him to imagine that he had.  After 
all, the broader statement is not accurate. 
The canon expressio unius est exclusio alterius—that the expression (or 
specification) of one thing is the exclusion of another thing—is a staple of 
legal interpretation.98  And reasonably so.  But expressio unius is not an 
iron rule to be given force in every case where a legal text gives a list of 
particulars.99  It is a rule of thumb that should be treated as defeasible when 
the circumstances make it inapposite, because not every list of particular 
items is written to exclude something not on the list.100  Put differently, dif-
 
that an argument about the extent of Congress’s powers must confront not just enumerations in 
general but the Constitution’s enumeration of Congress’s powers in particular.  But it is notewor-
thy, for present purposes, that when Lash wanted to make the point that we are really interested 
in one particular enumeration rather than in enumerations in general, he cited Marshall’s Gibbons 
dictum—the subject of which is not the one particular enumeration with which we ought to be 
concerned.  I take Lash’s use of the Gibbons dictum in this instance to typify the common slip-
page that I am here highlighting—that is, the tendency to treat Marshall’s statement was a state-
ment about the enumeration of all of Congress’s powers, even though Marshall was actually 
making a statement about an enumeration within just one power-conferring clause. 
 98 See, e.g., Barnhart v. Peabody Coal Co., 537 U.S. 149, 168 (2003) (explaining that the canon 
“has force” when interpreting listed items “of an ‘associated group or series’” because it may be 
inferred that other items were deliberately omitted). 
 99 See id. (“As we have held repeatedly, the canon expression unius est exclusio alterius does not 
apply to every statutory list or grouping . . . .”) 
100 It is of course possible that a given canon of legal interpretation is applied less often or less 
forcefully today than it might have been in a previous century.  But even if expressio unius was 
more robust in the 1780s than it is today, it would still have been a canon, and defeasible, rather 
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ferent enumerations have different presuppositions.  Some presuppose 
things not enumerated, and some do not. 
Suppose that I am leaving instructions for a friend who will stay in my 
house while I am on vacation.  I might write as follows: “You may use my 
shower, or you may use the kids’ shower, or you may use the guest show-
er.”  If my house has three showers, then this enumeration does not limit 
my friend’s choices at all.  If my friend has a certain sort of analytic mind, 
he might read the list, notice that the house has only three showers, and 
wonder why I bothered to write a longer sentence than “You may use any 
shower in the house.”  But if he also has basic common sense, he will not 
long be bothered by the question, because he will generate adequate expla-
nations.  Maybe I wrote the list that way to make sure he knows what all of 
his options are.  Or maybe I thought that giving permission to use the 
showers in general might still leave him wondering whether I preferred that 
he use a particular one, so it made sense to emphasize his equal privilege to 
use any of the three.101 
The preceding example shows that “enumeration presupposes some-
thing not enumerated” is not a rule true in all circumstances.  Some enu-
merations—even many enumerations—do presuppose things not enumerat-
ed.  But whether a particular enumeration presupposes something not 
enumerated is not a question that can be answered based solely on the fact 
that it is an enumeration.  The answer depends on facts about the particular 
enumeration: its words, its author, its audience, its function, the circum-
stances in which it is applied.  So we cannot simply say that Marshall’s 
characterization of one enumeration as presupposing something not enu-
merated is tantamount to a statement that some other enumeration also pre-
supposes something not enumerated.  To know whether the enumeration of 
Congress’s powers across the eighteen clauses of Section 8 and the twenty-
five or so other constitutional clauses conferring power on Congress102 is an 
enumeration presupposing something not enumerated, we would need to 
examine that enumeration.103 
 
than an inexorable rule.  Put differently, the thumb may be larger or smaller, but a rule of thumb 
is still a rule of thumb. 
101 See also Primus, supra note 25, at 27–29 (discussing some of the reasons for which an authorita-
tive body might write an enumeration of powers that does not exclude anything). 
102 See supra, Primus, supra note 11, at 581 n.14 (concluding that on a plausible reading there are 
twenty-five such clauses outside of Section 8). 
103 My reasons for concluding that the broader enumeration also does not support the internal-limits 
canon are given in Primus, supra note 11. 
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3.  The Gibbons Dictum and Federal Power over Intrastate Commerce 
Some readers may be similarly tempted by the thought that even though 
Marshall was not writing about the full enumeration of Congress’s powers, 
his construction of the Commerce Clause in Gibbons still shows that the 
powers of Congress add up to less than a general police power, because it 
specifies a subject of potential regulation that Congress’s enumerated pow-
ers do not reach.  According to the Gibbons dictum, purely intrastate com-
merce is not within the scope of the Commerce Clause.  If Congress cannot 
regulate certain intrastate commercial activities, the logic would run, then 
Congress lacks some authority that a government with general legislative 
jurisdiction would enjoy. 
But this analysis makes some basic mistakes.  For one, Marshall did not 
say that Congress may not regulate purely intrastate commerce.  His dictum 
placed that commerce beyond Congress’s authority under the Commerce 
Clause.  But as every constitutional lawyer should remember, the fact that 
one congressional power cannot underwrite a particular federal law does 
not mean that no congressional power could underwrite that law.104  Even if 
purely intrastate commerce is beyond the scope of the Commerce Clause, 
Congress can regulate many aspects of intrastate commerce with its power 
to tax, to make bankruptcy law, to regulate the value of money, or to grant 
patents and copyrights.  This point was clear and uncontested in the Gib-
bons litigation itself.105  Indeed, Marshall specifically indicated that com-
merce too local to be regulated under the Commerce Clause simpliciter 
might be federally regulated “for the purpose of executing some of the gen-
eral powers of the government”106—that is, under the Necessary and Proper 
Clause. 
Some commentators have missed this point.  They read Marshall in 
Gibbons as if he had articulated not a limit on the commerce power in par-
 
104 See, e.g., Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 2566, 2593 (2012) (Roberts, C.J.) 
(analyzing the Affordable Care Act’s individual mandate under the taxing power after determin-
ing that the mandate was not a valid exercise of the commerce power). 
105 In addition to their arguments about the commerce power, Ogden’s attorneys argued at length 
that New York’s steamboat monopoly had not been preempted by federal power under the Patent 
Clause, thus acknowledging that their client needed to address a problem rooted in another Con-
gressional power even if they carried their point about intrastate commerce.  See Gibbons v. Og-
den, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1, 45 (1824) (arguing that the Patent Clause was limited to “invention” 
and did not govern the monopoly at issue).  Similarly, when the New York Court for the Correc-
tion of Errors implemented the Gibbons decision, it construed federal regulation of the coasting 
trade as in part regulation under the Commerce Clause but in part as an exercise of the federal 
taxing power and, on the strength of the taxing power, deemed the federal regulatory scheme op-
erative even in purely intrastate settings, because the taxing power is not limited by the internal 
limits of the commerce power.  See N. River Steamboat Co. v. Livingston, 3 Cow. 713, 754–55 
(N.Y. 1825). 
106 Gibbons, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) at 195. 
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ticular but a limit on Congress’s powers as a whole.107  The error in this in-
terpretation may arise in part from a misunderstanding of Marshall’s state-
ment, a few sentences after the Gibbons dictum, that “[t]he completely in-
ternal commerce of a State . . . may be considered as reserved for the State 
itself.”108  It is not hard to see why a modern reader might read this lan-
guage and think that Marshall meant that Congress simply may not regulate 
purely intrastate commerce.  In some other constitutional contexts, a “re-
served” state power is one with which Congress may not interfere.109  So 
when some constitutional lawyers see Marshall’s characterization of intra-
state commerce as “reserved” for the states, they take him to mean that 
Congress is categorically forbidden to regulate that subject matter.110 
But Marshall was not summarily rejecting the basic idea that Congress 
can routinely do under one power something that it cannot do under anoth-
er.  He was simply saying that a state had the authority to regulate local 
commerce in the first instance, until and unless Congress enacted a con-
flicting law under some appropriate power.111  Modern lawyers take for 
granted that states can regulate in the absence of federal law, so it may not 
occur to them (us) that Marshall felt it necessary to make this point.  But in 
1824, many leading constitutional lawyers believed that the power speci-
fied in Clause iii lay in Congress exclusively, such that states were categor-
ically disabled from regulating whatever commerce lay within the Com-
merce Clause.112  Against that background assumption, characterizing 
intrastate commerce as “reserved” to the states was a way of saying that 
state laws regulating such commerce would not automatically be preempted 
as trenching on exclusive federal authority.  In other words, Marshall’s 
statement that the regulation of purely intrastate commerce was “reserved 
 
107 See, e.g., Randy Barnett, Is the Rehnquist Court an “Activist” Court?: The Commerce Clause 
Cases, 73 U. COLO. L. REV. 1275, 1283 (2002) (reading Marshall in Gibbons to have articulated, 
as “a constitutional imperative,” that wholly intrastate commerce must be protected “from the 
reach of Congress”). 
108 Gibbons, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) at 195. 
109 See, e.g., United States v. Butler, 297 U.S. 1, 68 (1936) (invalidating a portion of the Agricultural 
Adjustment Act on the grounds that the provision in question “invades the reserved rights of the 
states” by functioning as a regulation of agricultural production).  On the now-dominant reading 
of the Tenth Amendment, the word “reserved” in that provision also functions in this way.  See 
U.S. CONST. amend. X (describing the powers not delegated to the United States as “reserved to 
the States respectively, or to the people.”). 
110 See, e.g., Barnett, supra note 107, at 1283 (reading the Gibbons dictum as placing wholly intra-
state commerce fully beyond of the reach of Congress). 
111 Congress could not enact a conflicting law under its commerce power, of course; Marshall had 
already explained that the Commerce Clause did not cover purely intrastate commerce.  See Gib-
bons, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) at 195.  But Congress might enact a conflicting law as a taxing meas-
ure, or to enforce patents, or even as a law necessary and proper for carrying into execution some 
regulation passed under the Commerce Clause itself. 
112 See, e.g., id. at 13–14 (summarizing argument of Daniel Webster for Gibbons). 
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for the State” meant “the state has not lost its power to regulate intrastate 
commerce,” not “the power to regulate intrastate commerce belongs exclu-
sively to the state.”  Congressional regulation could still operate within the 
intrastate commercial realm, so long as it was justified by some power oth-
er than the commerce power standing alone. 
Marshall was never required to decide whether those other powers of 
Congress might be sufficient to regulate intrastate commerce pervasively, 
as opposed to simply here and there.  Maybe he imagined that some local 
commerce would be beyond any of Congress’s powers.  Maybe he thought 
that Congress could probably identify some power sufficient for regulating 
any aspect of commerce that the federal government was genuinely inter-
ested in regulating.  Or maybe he had no firm view one way or the other on 
this issue, which was in any case not presented for his decision.113  But 
modern constitutional law has confronted the question and resolved it deci-
sively in favor of plenary congressional power over commerce in general.  
It is a basic principle of twentieth and twenty-first century constitutional 
law—one confirmed, rather than threatened, by United States v. Lopez—
that Congress can regulate all commerce, no matter how local, because all 
commerce can affect interstate commerce sufficiently to be brought within 
the regulatory power of Congress under Clause iii. 
A review of some basic doctrine should make the point.  Under the 
Shreveport Rate cases, which are not controversial today, Congress may 
regulate intrastate commerce when the effective regulation of interstate 
commerce so requires.114  Under Wickard v. Filburn, Congress can regulate 
local economic activity so long as that activity, considered in the aggregate, 
has substantial effects on interstate commerce.115  And it is notorious that 
any economic activity has such effects when considered in the aggregate.  
There are differences of opinion as to whether Congress’s authority to 
regulate intrastate commerce under cases like Shreveport and Wickard is 
best understood as the commerce power simpliciter or, as Justice Scalia 
 
113 Marshall never wrote an opinion striking down a federal regulation of intrastate commerce, nor 
even an opinion suggesting that some regulation of that sort raised a difficult constitutional ques-
tion.  And he did sometimes make statements that, if read for all they might be worth, would 
suggest comfort with federal power to regulate all commercial affairs.  See, e.g., Cohens v. Vir-
ginia, 19 U.S. (6 Wheat.) 264, 413–14 (1821) (“[T]he United States form, for many, and for most 
important purposes, a single nation . . . . In war, we are one people.  In making peace, we are one 
people.  In all commercial regulations, we are one and the same people.  In many other respects, 
the American people are one, and the government which is alone capable of controlling and 
managing their interests in all these respects, is the government of the Union.”).  But it would 
overread the sources to claim that Marshall clearly endorsed the view that, for any imaginable 
aspect of local commerce, some enumerated power of Congress would always authorize regula-
tion. 
114 Houston, E. & W. Tex. Ry. Co. v. United States (Shreveport), 234 U.S. 342, 351–52 (1914). 
115 Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111, 128–29 (1942). 
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would have it, as the combined authority of the Commerce Clause and the 
Necessary and Proper Clause.116  But either way, modern doctrine indicates 
that pretty much any commercial activity can be federally regulated on the 
ground that its regulation is necessary and proper for carrying into execu-
tion the power to regulate interstate commerce. 
To be sure, it is orthodox that neither the Commerce Clause nor the 
Commerce Clause in conjunction with the Necessary and Proper Clause 
can be construed as the equivalent of a federal police power.  Lopez holds 
that even in conjunction with the Necessary and Proper Clause, the com-
merce power does not authorize Congress to regulate non-economic activi-
ties, even if in the aggregate such activities substantially affect interstate 
commerce.117  Moreover, five Justices opined in Sebelius that even in con-
junction with the Necessary and Proper Clause, the commerce power does 
not entitle Congress to regulate inactivity as opposed to activity.118  But if 
some potential subject of regulation is concededly activity and concededly 
economic, Congress may regulate it through some combination of its com-
merce power and its necessary and proper power, provided of course that 
the federal law falls foul of no external constitutional limit.  The contention 
that such a potential subject of regulation is “local” or “intrastate” is of no 
doctrinal consequence. 
Lopez itself confirms the point.  The Supreme Court in that case did not 
determine that 18 U.S.C. § 922(q)—the Gun-Free School Zones Act—lay 
beyond Congress’s commerce power because that section regulated purely 
intrastate commerce.  Instead, the Court held that § 922(q) did not regulate 
commerce at all—indeed, that it did not regulate any economic activity.119  
Had the Court deemed the possession of firearms to be a form of com-
merce, even of a very local sort, its analysis would have required that 
§ 922(q) be upheld.  Lopez declares that the Wickard inquiry, which asks 
whether an activity considered in the aggregate has substantial effects on 
interstate commerce, is appropriate for economic activities but not for non-
economic activities.120  Even the most local commerce is economic activity.  
It is commerce, after all.  So if the possession of firearms were a form of 
local commerce, the Court would have had to ask whether in the aggregate 
that commerce substantially affected commerce among the several states.  
The answer would have been yes, just as it is for any activity whose effects 
are eligible for aggregation under Wickard.  That is why the government 
 
116 See Gonzales v. Raich, 545 U.S. 1, 33–35 (2005) (Scalia, J., concurring). 
117 United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 561 (1995). 
118 Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 2566, 2589 (2012) (Roberts, C.J., joined by 
Scalia, Kennedy, Thomas, and Alito, JJ.). 
119 Lopez, 514 U.S. at 561. 
120 Id. 
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urged the Court in Lopez to undertake the Wickard analysis, as well as why 
the Court declined.  But the Court did not decline on the theory that the 
possession of a firearm is too local a form of commerce to be eligible for 
aggregation.  The Court declined on the theory that the possession of a fire-
arm is not economic activity at all and hence not commercial activity in the 
first place.121  So to be sure, Lopez holds that the Commerce Clause does 
not confer general regulatory power.  But Lopez neither presumes nor im-
plies the existence of commercial activity that lies beyond federal regulato-
ry power because it is “purely intrastate.”  On the contrary, it reaffirms the 
modern view that if some potential subject of regulation is concededly 
commercial activity, it is sure to have effects on interstate commerce and to 
be regulable under Congress’s commerce power accordingly. 
This modern position might or might not be strictly reconcilable with 
Marshall’s analysis.  It depends on whether the modern warrant for con-
gressional regulation of even the most local commercial activity lies in the 
Commerce Clause itself (which would conflict with Marshall’s analysis in 
Gibbons) or in the combination of that Clause and the Necessary and Prop-
er Clause (which might not).  But either way, modern doctrine does author-
ize Congress to regulate all commercial activity, no matter how local.  And 
if there is no commerce too local to come within the compass of congres-
sional regulation, then the Gibbons dictum’s articulated limitation on the 
scope of the Commerce Clause in no way limits what Congress can do.  To 
the extent that the dictum ever stated a limit on Congress, it is a limit that is 
no longer a part of constitutional law, even in the age of Lopez and Sebe-
lius. Under prevailing doctrine, Congress can regulate commerce without 
regard to its status as intrastate or interstate.  This federal regulatory author-
ity is accepted by everyone who accepts Shreveport and Wickard—or Gon-
zales v. Raich122—which is to say by a broad consensus of constitutional 
interpreters.  It therefore makes little sense to think that Marshall’s Gibbons 
dictum reflects the immunity of local commercial matters from congres-
sional regulation. 
To be sure, plenary congressional power over commerce does not mean 
that Congress has the equivalent of a police power, because plenary power 
over commerce is not the same thing as plenary power in general.  But if 
congressional power is not in practice as broad as a police power, it is not 
because the Commerce Clause leaves Congress unable to regulate intrastate 
commerce.  In reality, Congress can regulate commerce from top to bot-
tom, so the Gibbons dictum’s distinction between purely local commerce 
 
121 Id. 
122 Gonzales v. Raich, 545 U.S. 1, 32–33 (2005) (upholding the application of the Controlled Sub-
stances Act to home-grown marijuana intended for individual use). 
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and other commerce identifies no limit on federal power.  On the question 
of whether the sum total of Congress’s powers leaves Congress unable to 
do anything that it could do with a general police power, the Gibbons dic-
tum should have no bearing at all. 
II.  GIBBONS AND THE POWER OF STATES 
The post-Lopez misreading of the Gibbons dictum is rooted in a failure 
to remember an important difference between modern constitutional law 
and the constitutional law of the early nineteenth century.  Today, we think 
of the Commerce Clause chiefly as an authorization for federal legislation, 
and the greatest question regarding the commerce power is whether the 
commerce power has meaningful internal limits.  What may Congress not 
do under its commerce power, every law student learns to ask, short of ex-
ternal limits like those in the Bill of Rights?  When we read Marshall say-
ing that the enumeration presupposes something not enumerated, we natu-
rally do so through our own pressing concerns, and that framing makes the 
dictum seem like a statement of the internal-limits canon.  But when Gib-
bons was litigated, Marshall’s audience was not chiefly worried about 
whether Congress might have the functional equivalent of a police power.  
It was much more worried about whether the police powers of states would 
be held subject to far-reaching constitutional preemption, even in situations 
where Congress had not legislated. 
As briefly noted above, many leading lawyers early in the nineteenth 
century took the view that the power specified in the Commerce Clause 
was vested in Congress exclusively.123  State laws regulating commerce 
“with foreign Nations, and among the several States, and with the Indian 
Tribes” were, on that view, unconstitutional encroachments on a federal 
preserve.124  Depending on how broadly the federal commerce power was 
construed, the body of state law that might be preempted could be moder-
ate, large, or catastrophically huge.  By reading the Commerce Clause as 
not reaching intrastate commerce, Marshall tempered the threat of preemp-
tion, reassuring states that a broad swath of traditional local regulation was 
not under threat.  State laws regulating commerce within the federal com-
merce power might all be invalid, but state laws regulating local commerce 
could stand.125  In other words, Marshall’s statement that the enumeration 
presupposes something not enumerated was not primarily significant as a 
statement about the limits of the power of Congress at all.  To the extent 
 
123 See supra note 112 and accompanying text. 
124  U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3. 
125 Assuming, of course, that Congress did not affirmatively displace them with laws passed under 
other powers. 
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that the Gibbons dictum said something significant, it was significant as a 
statement about the regulatory power of states. 
Marshall’s opinion positively entraps modern readers into missing this 
point.  Our natural tendency is to think of Commerce Clause cases as pre-
senting issues about what Congress may do and only secondarily, in the 
particular context of dormant commerce doctrine, as issues about what 
states may do.  Because Marshall officially decided Gibbons on the basis of 
the federal statutes giving licenses to participate in the coasting trade, Gib-
bons appears to fit the paradigm that modern readers expect of a Commerce 
Clause case.  It seems to be a case about the validity of a federal law.  In 
reality, however, the coasting-trade issue was a bit of misdirection in Gib-
bons, one that Marshall seized upon to avoid ruling on the real issue: 
whether the commerce power was exclusive in Congress.  Much of Mar-
shall’s contemporary audience saw through his tendentious reading of the 
coasting license, and Marshall probably expected them to.126  But audiences 
in the twentieth and twenty-first centuries have been easier to fool, because 
they (we) are primed to be receptive to the idea that the issue in a com-
merce case is about the validity of a federal law. 
This Part explains that Marshall’s dictum about the enumeration pre-
supposing something not enumerated is better understood as a statement 
about the prima facie powers of states than as a statement about the limits 
of congressional authority.  In Part II.A, I present Gibbons v. Ogden as it 
appeared to its contemporaries: not as a case about the federal laws regulat-
ing the coasting trade, but as a case about the rivalry between the powerful 
state of New York and its less-powerful neighbors.  In Part II.B, I lay out 
the central constitutional question that the case presented.  Was New 
York’s bid to dominate its neighbors automatically blocked by the preemp-
tive force of the Commerce Clause, deemed to vest the power to regulate 
commerce exclusively in the federal government?  Or did the states enjoy 
concurrent authority to regulate commercial affairs, in which case the con-
flict among rival states would continue unless Congress actively inter-
vened?  In Part II.C, I trace that central question through the Gibbons litiga-
tion from its origins in New York through its resolution at the Supreme 
Court and then back to New York again.  As that analysis shows, the coast-
ing-license rationale on which Marshall officially disposed of the case was 
not the real driver of the decision.  The animating issues were whether the 
federal power over commerce was exclusive of state regulatory authority 
over the same domain and, if so, how broadly existing state laws on a 
whole variety of subjects would be held unconstitutional.  Marshall’s 
statement that the enumeration of three classes of commerce presupposed 
 
126 See infra notes 233, 240 and accompanying text. 
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an excluded sphere of intrastate commerce was more significant in that 
context—as a way of permitting states continued regulatory authority, ra-
ther than as a limitation on Congress. 
A.  The Bigger Rivalry 
To see the big issue in Gibbons in the way that it appeared to the legal 
world at the time, it is important to recognize that the personal rivalry be-
tween Ogden and Gibbons played out in the middle of a much larger rivalry 
among states.  Even more so than the personal rivalry, the state rivalry was 
an uneven one.  New York had been a middle-of-the-pack state when the 
Constitution was adopted,127 but it enjoyed explosive growth in the decades 
following.  By 1810, New York was the largest state by population.128  Its 
economic power grew as well.  By the time construction of the Erie Canal 
began in 1817, New York was a colossus.  The canal seemed, and was, on-
ly destined to increase its predominance. 
As New York grew in power, it failed to assure its less-powerful neigh-
bors that it would play with them nicely.  Consider, for example, the ques-
tion of who owned the Hudson River waters on which Gibbons’s and Og-
den’s ferries operated.  One might think that the boundary between New 
York and New Jersey would lie at the river’s halfway point, and indeed that 
was New Jersey’s position.  But New York claimed title to the whole river, 
all the way to the New Jersey side.129  In New York’s view, therefore, many 
Hudson River shipping routes between one New Jersey port and another 
New Jersey port ran, on the water, entirely within the jurisdiction of New 
York.  New Yorkers were not shy about asserting that jurisdiction.  In one 
case litigated before Gibbons and Ogden were at each other’s throats, John 
Livingston sued them both on the theory that their Hudson River ferry 
routes operating solely between points in New Jersey violated his exclusive 
 
127 At the Constitutional Convention, the interest bloc that we think of as the “large states” had es-
sentially three members: Virginia, Massachusetts, and Pennsylvania.  North Carolina was the 
fourth-largest state by population, and New York was fifth.  See BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, 
U.S. DEP’T OF COMMERCE, HISTORICAL STATISTICS OF THE UNITED STATES: COLONIAL TIMES 
TO 1970 24–37 (1975), http://www.census.gov/history/pdf/histstats-colonial-1970.pdf (reporting 
state-by-state population information, starting in 1790). 
128 See id. (counting the total resident population of the states from 1790–1970); MEDIA PROJECTS 
INC., GROWTH OF U.S. POPULATION, 1790–1840, http:// www.granburyisd.org/cms/lib/
TX01000552/Centricity/Domain/287/Fact_Sheet_U5_Growth_in_Population.pdf (“In the 1810 
census, New York edged out Virginia as the nation’s most populous state for the first 
time . . . .”). 
129 See supra note 77. 
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right to use steamboats in New York waters.130  And in the courts of New 
York, Livingston won.131 
In this context, neighboring states naturally saw New York’s prohibi-
tion on steamboat navigation by anyone not licensed by the state of New 
York as part of an economic power play.  New York was encroaching on 
the commerce of other states, even commerce that other states thought of as 
internal to themselves.  (The nickname “Empire State,” which was in use 
by the 1820s,132 might have been pronounced with pride by New Yorkers.  
But one imagines that beyond the state line, it had a more sinister ring.)  
More broadly, shipping to and from ports in New York claimed a large and 
increasing share of commercial activity along the Eastern Seaboard.  If 
New York limited which ships could ply its waters, it could put businesses 
in many states at the mercy of well-connected New Yorkers like Living-
ston.133 
New York’s neighbors lacked the economic heft to compete on equal 
terms.  But they retaliated as best they could.  New Jersey passed a statute 
providing that anyone who enforced New York’s exclusive steamboat fran-
chise against a New Jersey operator would be liable, in New Jersey, to the 
amount of treble damages, and that New York steamboats could be seized 
if they came to rest on the New Jersey shore.134  Connecticut simply passed 
a law barring entry into its waters to any steamboat operating under a li-
cense from the holder of New York’s exclusive steamboat privilege.135  As 
a result, there could be no steamboat traffic at all between New York and 
Connecticut, nor from New York to the other New England states through 
Connecticut’s waters in the Long Island Sound.  In short, New York and its 
 
130 See Livingston v. Ogden, 4 Johns. Ch. 48, 48–49 (N.Y. Ch. 1819) (explaining Defendant’s al-
leged violations of Livingston’s rights). 
131 See id. at 52–53 (enjoining Defendant Gibbons from “navigating the waters” of New York). 
132 Milton M. Klein, Introduction to THE EMPIRE STATE: A HISTORY OF NEW YORK xvii, at xix 
(Milton M. Klein ed. 2001). 
133 Formally, of course, New York did not exclude Gibbons or anyone else from its waters by virtue 
of the exclusive grant to Fulton and Livingston and their later assignees.  As counsel pointed out, 
people not holding the franchise were perfectly free to navigate in New York waters under sail, 
or by rowing, or by any other technology not within the terms of the grant to Fulton and Living-
ston.  See Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1, 124 (“Every steam boat . . . . may, without 
objection . . . come, by means of steam, to the verge of our waters; there is no difficulty opposed 
to its coming up . . . provided that, for the short space of time while it may be in our waters, it 
employs the only things that any other vessel can employ for entering and departing . . . sails and 
oars.”).  Given the superiority of steamboat travel, however, this point offered little practical 
comfort.  In an age when the issue of Net Neutrality focuses attention on the serious economic 
consequences of delaying a transmission by even the smallest amount of time, it is easy to under-
stand why making shippers other than the one holding New York’s exclusive franchise navigate 
the Hudson under sail would be completely unable to compete with steamboat traffic. 
134 See Gibbons, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) at 4–5 (describing New Jersey’s statute as an “act of retortion 
against the illegal and oppressive legislation of New-York”). 
135 Id. at 4. 
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neighbors were locked in a war over navigation rights that looked like it 
would have been perfectly at home in 1786, when James Madison and oth-
ers decried the interstate protectionism that they believed made a stronger 
central government essential.136  The Constitution was now in force, but the 
problem persisted. 
One might well ask why Congress didn’t step in.  Madison’s vision, of 
course, had been that a national legislature would nullify the states’ mutual-
ly destructive protectionist tendencies.137  Even in 1824, no serious body of 
opinion doubted that Congress’s power to regulate interstate commerce in-
cluded the power to open interstate waterways to free traffic on some pre-
scribed set of terms.  The argument that the case could be decided by refer-
ence to Gibbons’s federally granted license to pursue the coasting trade 
was, in essence, a claim that Congress had already done just that.  But giv-
en the serious weakness of that argument,138 as well as the fact that the ex-
istence of coasting licenses had not in fact prevented New York, New Jer-
sey, and Connecticut from wreaking havoc, it is probably unsound to think 
that Congress refrained from further intervention in the tri-state imbroglio 
because it thought it had already solved the problem.  In the end, there may 
be no single answer to the question, “Why didn’t Congress pass a real stat-
ute straightening out the mess in New York?”  Partial answers may range 
from the blocking power of New York’s congressional delegation to the 
general background fact that Congress didn’t regulate much in the early 
nineteenth century.  But whatever the reasons for Congress’s not having 
done more, more it did not do.  If the constitutional system was going to 
have a solution for the steamboat war, it would have to come from a differ-
ent quarter. 
B.  The Bigger Question 
Chief Justice John Marshall’s solution was to break the New York mo-
nopoly on the strength of Gibbons’s argument about his federal coasting 
license.139  But to think of the case as presenting the question of whether 
federal authority could supersede New York law is to miss the real issue at 
stake.  That an applicable congressional statute would overcome state law 
was obvious.  The contentious question was whether and to what extent 
 
136 See, e.g., MADISON, supra note 73, at 346 (describing a calamitous “want of concert in matters 
where common interest requires it . . . [as] strongly illustrated in the state of our commercial af-
fairs”). 
137 See ALISON L. LACROIX, THE IDEOLOGICAL ORIGINS OF AMERICAN FEDERALISM 149–50 (2010) 
(describing Madison’s vision as articulated on this point in the Virginia Plan). 
138 See infra Part II.C.3. 
139 Gibbons, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) at 212–13. 
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New York could enact commercial regulations at all, even in the absence of 
superseding federal law.140 
That question is not one that modern lawyers ask.  For more than a cen-
tury now, it has been clear that states are free to enforce nondiscrimintarory 
commercial regulations unless Congress has enacted some statutory policy 
preempting them.  States exercise a general police power, and that power 
includes the power to regulate garden-variety economic matters.  But things 
were different in 1820.  Whether the states’ police power included the au-
thority to regulate commerce was at that time a seriously contested ques-
tion, as well as a greatly consequential one. 
Since the turn of the twentieth century, the dominant Commerce Clause 
narrative has been the expansion of congressional regulation.  The story 
runs from Champion v. Ames141 and Shreveport142 through Hammer v. 
Dagenhart143 and Schechter Poultry144 to Darby,145 Wickard,146 and Heart 
of Atlanta Motel,147 and then to Lopez,148 Morrison,149 Raich,150 and Sebe-
lius.151  Every living American lawyer learned in law school to confront 
Commerce Clause issues first and foremost as issues about the extent of 
Congress’s power to regulate. 
The nineteenth century was different.  For the first hundred years of life 
under the Constitution, Congress enacted little legislation under its com-
merce power, and constitutional law did not centrally feature the question 
of whether this or that federal law was within Congress’s power to regulate 
commerce.  No federal statute faced a serious constitutional challenge on 
Commerce Clause grounds until after the Civil War—indeed, until the 
moment when the narrative described in the paragraph above begins.152  To 
 
140 See, e.g., id. at 8–17, 24–25 (summarizing argument of Webster, for Gibbons, against New 
York’s authority to legislate); id. at 60–64 (summarizing argument of Oakley, for Ogden, in fa-
vor of New York’s authority to legislate). 
141 188 U.S. 321, 362–64 (1903). 
142 Houston, E. & W. Tex. Ry. Co. v. United States (Shreveport), 234 U.S. 342, 351–52 (1914). 
143 247 U.S. 251, 268, 276 (1918). 
144 A.L.A. Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States (Schechter Poultry), 295 U.S. 495, 549–51 
(1935). 
145 United States v. Darby, 312 U.S. 100, 125–26 (1941). 
146 Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111, 124–25 (1942). 
147 Heart of Atlanta Motel, Inc. v. United States, 379 U.S. 241, 261–62 (1964). 
148 United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549 (1995). 
149 United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 627 (2000). 
150 Gonzales v. Raich, 545 U.S. 1, 32–33 (2005). 
151 Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 132 S.Ct. 2566, 2589, 2600 (2012). 
152 The Supreme Court’s first serious discussion of whether a federal statute sub judice might be 
invalid because it exceeded Congress’s power under the Commerce Clause came in Trade-Mark 
Cases, 100 U.S. 82 (1879).  The Court’s view in the Trade-Mark Cases that the legislation before 
it was not sustainable as an exercise of the commerce power seems reasonably clear from the ma-
jority opinion.  Technically, however, the Court declined to reach that constitutional question, 
concluding instead that Congress had not meant to exercise its commerce authority.  See id. at 
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be sure, the Commerce Clause played an important role in nineteenth-
century constitutional law, and courts frequently asked whether particular 
statutes were compatible with the commerce power.  But the cases raising 
that question were not cases testing the constitutionality of federal laws.  
They were cases testing the constitutionality of state laws.  In Brown v. 
Maryland,153 Willson v. Black Bird Creek Marsh Co.,154 Mayor of New 
York v. Miln,155 the License Cases,156 and the Passenger Cases,157 judges in 
the early Republic took the measure of the commerce power not to deter-
mine whether Congress had regulated ultra vires but to determine whether 
some state had regulated in an area where states were affirmatively divest-
ed of regulatory authority by a grant of exclusive power to Congress.  And 
the first of those cases was Gibbons v. Ogden. 
These early commerce cases resemble modern dormant commerce cases 
in one way: they raised the possibility that state laws regulating commerce 
were invalid even in the absence of conflict with some federal statute.  But 
the older cases were also importantly different from modern dormant 
commerce cases.  Today, the critical question in most dormant commerce 
cases is whether state law discriminates against other states in some inap-
propriate way158 or, on a different theory of the doctrine, whether state law 
exercises an inordinate burden on the flow of commerce in an interstate 
market.159  States are presumed to have the power to enact economic legis-
lation, and the respect due to other states in the Union and perhaps to the 
national free market as such imposes limits on that power—limits that the 
judiciary polices in the absence of congressional intervention.  In the nine-
teenth century, the critical question was often whether a state had the power 
to regulate in the relevant domain at all.  If the power to regulate commerce 
among the states was not just vested in Congress but exclusively vested in 
Congress, a state law regulating interstate commerce would be invalid 
 
95–98 (leaving the Commerce Clause issue formally undecided).  In United States v. E.C. 
Knight, 156 U.S. 1, 16–17 (1895), the Court read the Sherman Act narrowly so as to avoid giving 
it a meaning that would exceed Congress’s commerce power.  The first Supreme Court case 
squarely holding a federal statute or an application of a federal statute void because it exceeded 
Congress’s power under the Commerce Clause was Howard v. Ill. Cent. R. Co., 207 U.S. 463, 
502–04 (1908). 
153 25 U.S. (12 Wheat.) 419, 445–49 (1827). 
154 27 U.S. (2 Pet.) 245, 251–52 (1829). 
155 36 U.S. (11 Pet.) 102, 143 (1837). 
156 Thurlow v. Massachusetts (License Cases), 46 U.S. (5 How.) 504, 582–83 (1847) (opinion of 
Taney, C.J.). 
157 Smith v. Turner (Passenger Cases), 48 U.S. (7 How.) 283, 408–10 (1849) (plurality opinion). 
158 See, e.g., Dep’t of Revenue of Ky. v. Davis, 553 U.S. 328, 350–53 (2008) (upholding state in-
come tax exemption for income earned on in-state municipal bonds). 
159 See Pike v. Bruce Church, Inc., 397 U.S. 137, 142 (1970) (striking down a state law on the 
ground that the burden it imposed on interstate commerce was excessive in comparison to the lo-
cal benefits it secured). 
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whether or not it discriminated against the commercial interests of other 
states and whether or not it created an outsized burden on interstate com-
merce. 
Whether the power to regulate commerce among the states lay exclu-
sively with Congress or concurrently in Congress and the state govern-
ments was an issue that fundamentally divided leading constitutional law-
yers.  John Marshall favored the first answer,160 and Chief Justice Roger 
Taney decisively endorsed the second.161  The concurrent-power position 
eventually prevailed, tempered by rules prohibiting some state legislation 
that discriminates against the interests of fellow states and perhaps also 
some state legislation that creates outsized burdens on interstate com-
merce—that is, by dormant commerce doctrine.  But until that settlement 
emerged, the question of whether the federal commerce power was exclu-
sive was among the most contentious in constitutional law. 
C.  The Steamboat War and the Exclusive-Power Problem 
Gibbons was the first commerce-power case that the Supreme Court 
ever decided, and it directly raised the contested issue of whether the com-
merce power was exclusive or concurrent.  As the case was seen both prior 
to argument and in the arguments themselves, the big question was whether 
New York’s law granting a legal monopoly on steamboat traffic, and per-
haps the rival states’ retaliatory laws as well, should be struck down as un-
constitutionally encroaching on Congress’s exclusive power to regulate 
commerce.162  The matter of a federal license under the coasting trade was 
a sideshow—one that came on the scene late and that Marshall used, deftly 
if tendentiously, to avoid ruling on the deep and divisive issue. 
1.  Livingston v. Van Ingen 
To see how the problem in Gibbons appeared to the participants at the 
time, start by going back to an important piece of predecessor litigation: 
 
160 See infra Part II.C. 
161 See, e.g., License Cases, 46 U.S. (5 How.) at 579 (opinion of Taney, C.J.) (“[T]he mere grant of 
power to the general government cannot, upon any just principles of construction, be construed 
to be an absolute prohibition to the exercise of any power over the same subject by the States.  
The controlling and supreme power over commerce with foreign nations and the several States is 
undoubtedly conferred upon Congress.  Yet, in my judgment, the State may nevertheless, for the 
safety or convenience of trade, or for the protection of the health of its citizens, make regulations 
of commerce for its own ports and harbours, and for its own territory; and such regulations are 
valid unless they come in conflict with a law of Congress.”). 
162 See supra note 140 and accompanying text (noting that Webster argued in Gibbons that New 
York could not enact commercial regulations at all, even in the absence of superseding federal 
law). 
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Livingston v. Van Ingen.163  When the State of New York initially granted 
an exclusive franchise for the operation of steamboats within its waters, the 
grant was not to John Livingston but jointly to a two-man team: Robert 
Fulton, the engineer known (if inaccurately) to generations of American 
schoolchildren as the inventor of the steamboat,164 and John Livingston’s 
elder brother Robert Livingston, briefly encountered (and promptly forgot-
ten) by the same schoolchildren as the least memorable member of the five-
man committee that drafted the Declaration of Independence.165  But the 
fact that Robert Livingston’s fame has not equaled that of his fellow 1776 
committeemen says more about the extraordinary roles of Thomas Jeffer-
son, Benjamin Franklin, John Adams, and Roger Sherman than about any 
lack of heft on Livingston’s part.  In addition to having served on the Dec-
laration Committee, Robert Livingston was Chancellor of New York, Unit-
ed States Secretary of Foreign Affairs under the Articles of Confederation, 
and Minister to France in the Jefferson Administration—a position in 
which he negotiated the Louisiana Purchase.166  As this resume suggests, 
Livingston was both a sophisticated lawyer and a well-connected politician.  
Robert Fulton was the engineering end of the steamboat partnership; Rob-
ert Livingston was the business end, and the legal end, and the political 
end—and formidably so. 
Sometime after Livingston and Fulton obtained their exclusive fran-
chise from the state to operate steamboats in New York waters, a group of 
would-be steamboat operators from Albany challenged or simply flouted 
the grant.  (Livingston took to calling the challengers “the Albanians.”)167  
Livingston and Fulton sued in New York’s Chancery Court to enforce their 
monopoly.168  The Albanians defended not on the ground that some federal 
 
163 9 Johns. 507 (N.Y. 1812). 
164 In the litigation over the monopoly, it was important to Fulton and Livingston that Fulton had 
merely appropriated and repurposed an invention of others, rather than invented the steamboat 
himself, because if he were the inventor, New York might be disabled from conferring exclusive 
privileges on him, because the grant of such a monopoly might infringe on Congress’s enumerat-
ed power to secure time-limited monopolies to inventors.  See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8 (spec-
ifying that Congress has the right to give inventors exclusive rights to the use of their inventions 
for limited times); Van Ingen, 9 Johns. at 520, 558–60 (Yates, J.) (specifying that Fulton dis-
claimed the status of inventor for this reason). 
165 Van Ingen, 9 Johns. at 511–12. 
166 See 1 CUYLER REYNOLDS, GENEALOGICAL AND FAMILY HISTORY OF SOUTHERN NEW YORK 
AND THE HUDSON RIVER VALLEY: A RECORD OF THE ACHIEVEMENTS OF HER PEOPLE IN THE 
MAKING OF A COMMONWEALTH AND THE BUILDING OF A NATION 176, 280 (1913) (listing the 
accomplishments of Robert Livingston). 
167 See BAXTER, supra note 44, at 21 (describing a number of Livingston’s references to the “Alba-
nians,” meaning the group of rival businessmen including James Van Ingen).  I am advised that 
residents of twenty-first century Albany sometimes use this term to describe themselves but that 
the term is not in common use. 
168 See Van Ingen, 9 Johns. at 514–25. 
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statute displaced New York’s law but on the theory that New York had no 
power to regulate steamboat commerce in the first place.169  The power to 
regulate commerce, argued the Albanians, lay exclusively with Congress.170  
If it didn’t, New York (and other states) could effectively destroy all sorts 
of interstate and even international navigation.  Imagine, they said, a 
steamboat merely passing through New York’s waters while traveling from 
New Jersey to Connecticut.171  Could New York really interdict its pas-
sage?  Worse yet, could New York block a vessel steaming south from 
Canada?172  Nor was the threat limited to steamboats.  If New York could 
restrict or prohibit steamboat traffic, the argument ran, it could also prohibit 
navigation by sailing vessels.173  In short, to afford New York a power to 
regulate commerce was to invite the kind of Balkanized regime for naviga-
tion and trade that made the federal commerce power necessary in the first 
place.  For that federal power to do its job, it must be exclusively federal.174 
In Livingston v. Van Ingen, the highest court in New York rejected this 
contention, siding unanimously with Livingston and Fulton.175  Being an 
arm of the State of New York, the court might not have been disposed to 
worry that New York was a threat to the United States of America.  And as 
a court whose membership included the membership of the State Senate,176 
the New York Court for the Correction of Errors was surely attuned to the 
costs of deciding that every regulation of commerce in the New York stat-
ute book must be regarded as invalid.  Construing the commerce power as 
exclusive in Congress, the Justices wrote, would disable the state from en-
forcing scads of garden-variety laws that concerned commerce to one de-
gree or another—regulations involving roads, bridges, canals, and ferries, 
not to mention Sunday laws, pauper laws, health and inspection laws, liq-
uor laws, and laws prohibiting the importation of slaves.177  Surely the 
Constitution did not require such an extensive disabling of local regulatory 
power.  And so, they concluded, the power to regulate commerce must be 
vested in the states and the federal government concurrently, rather than in 
Congress to the exclusion of the states.178 
 
169 See id. at 537–43. 
170 See id. 
171 See id. at 542–43. 
172 See id. 
173 See id. 
174 See id. 
175 Id. at 507–08. 
176 Irving Browne, The New York Court of Errors, 19 AM. L. REV. 21, 21 (1985). 
177 See Van Ingen, 9 Johns. at 561, 568–69, 580 (including references in the opinions of Yates, 
Thompson, JJ., and Kent, C.J.). 
178 See id. at 577–80 (Kent, C.J.). 
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Note, however, that the New York court’s expressed concern was not 
that Congress might imperiously countermand local laws by invoking its 
authority to regulate commerce.  The reach of actual federal laws was not 
at issue.179  The concern was that a doctrine of exclusive congressional 
power to regulate commerce would preempt huge swaths of extant local 
law, leaving the regulation of relevant spheres of life disastrously un-
addressed by any lawmaking authority. 
The clearest treatment of the issues in Van Ingen came from Chief Jus-
tice James Kent, one of the leading legal thinkers of the early Republic.  
Like his fellow Justices, Kent wrote that all sorts of necessary local regula-
tions would be preempted if the power to regulate commerce were held to 
be vested in Congress exclusively.180  It would therefore be sensible to con-
strue the commerce power as vested in Congress and the states concurrent-
ly, unless the Commerce Clause expressly required the exclusive-power 
approach.181  Fortunately, the text of Clause iii did not so require.182  As 
Kent explained, the words could be read as creating in Congress only a 
concurrent power of regulation, albeit one that would supersede state law 
when it was used.  So the power should be construed as concurrent.183  It 
would be deeply unsound, Kent continued, to imagine that a state was di-
vested of the authority to enact internal regulations 
merely because we can imagine that congress, in the plenary exercise of its 
power to regulate commerce, may make some regulation inconsistent with the 
exercise of this privilege.  When such a case arises, it will provide for itself; 
and there is, fortunately, a paramount power in the supreme court of the United 
States to guard against the mischiefs of collision.184 
In other words, if a federal statute contradicted some New York law 
regulating New York’s internal commerce, New York would have to give 
way.  But in the absence of conflict, it made little sense to bar New York 
from acting.185 
Livingston v. Van Ingen thus held, on the authority of New York’s 
highest court, that the power to regulate commerce lay in Congress and the 
states concurrently.  The New York law granting Livingston and Fulton a 
legal monopoly over steamboat traffic within the waters of New York was 
 
179 See id. at 579 (arguing that Congress’s power to regulate commerce does not imply that the 
States do not have the power to regulate commerce to the extent that regulation is not incon-
sistent with acts of Congress). 
180 See id. at 580. 
181 See id. at 578. 
182 See id. at 577. 
183 See id. at 578. 
184 Id. at 579. 
185 Kent expressed doubt that such conflicts would in fact arise.  But he was also clear that if such a 
conflict did arise, the courts would uphold federal authority.  See id. 
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valid.  And with that legal issue resolved, the parties proceeded to the prac-
tical business of settlement.  Livingston and Fulton offered to license the 
Albanians to operate steamboats on the Hudson river, for appropriate fees, 
and on the condition that the Albanians would not seek further review from 
the United States Supreme Court.  Figuring it was a deal good enough to 
take, the Albanians agreed.186  And there matters rested, at least for a little 
while. 
2.  Ogden v. Gibbons 
When Thomas Gibbons set out to destroy the business associate who 
had counseled Gibbons’s wife about the possibility of divorce, Livingston 
v. Van Ingen was the law of New York.  Ogden held a license to operate his 
steamboat from John Livingston, brother and assignee of the original fran-
chise holder, and any competing line that Gibbons might open would be il-
legal.  Gibbons accordingly knew that once he started operating his ferry, 
Ogden would sue in New York on the strength of Van Ingen.  So Gibbons 
had only two possibilities for a successful defense.  Either he would need a 
way to distinguish Van Ingen, or he would have to take his case to the 
United States Supreme Court and hope for a decision overruling the courts 
of New York. 
Gibbons knew that to succeed by distinguishing Van Ingen, he would 
have to persuade none other than James Kent, who had written a detailed 
opinion in the earlier litigation.  Like the Van Ingen litigation before it, Og-
den’s suit would lie initially in the Court of Chancery.  And shortly after 
Van Ingen was decided, Kent had left the position of Chief Justice to as-
sume the role of Chancellor.187  So Gibbons and his lawyers did what good 
lawyers do.188  They read Kent’s opinion in Van Ingen, looking for a way to 
distinguish the next case.  And indeed, the Kent opinion seemed to draw a 
map for a future litigant in Gibbons’s position.  In ruling for Livingston 
back in 1812, Kent had explained that Van Ingen raised no question involv-
ing any federal law.189  His ruling had been that in the absence of federal 
law, the mere possibility of conflict with a future federal law could not bar 
 
186 See Gibbons v. Ogden, 17 Johns. 488, 508 (N.Y. 1820) (describing the decision of many chal-
lengers in the Van Ingen litigation to accept licenses from Livingston rather than continue their 
legal battle). 
187 See James Kent, ENCYC. BRITANNICA, http://www.britannica.com/biography/James-Kent 
(providing that Kent was chancellor of the New York Court of Chancery from 1814–1823). 
188 Gibbons was himself a lawyer, but he was also well represented, including of course by Webster.  
See supra note 71 and accompanying text. 
189 See Livingston v. Van Ingen, 9 Johns. 507, 579 (N.Y. 1812) (opinion of Kent, C.J.) (stating that 
Van Ingen did not raise a question involving federal law). 
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New York from regulating.190  Only if some actual federal statute conflict-
ed with New York’s law would the federal commerce power be relevant.  
So Gibbons sought to present his case as the different one that Kent had 
imagined.  In Van Ingen, Gibbons argued, there was no issue of conflict 
with federal authority.  But in his own case, he continued, there was indeed 
a conflicting federal authority in his case, because his vessels were licensed 
to pursue the coasting trade under federal statute.191 
One should give Gibbons credit for trying.  The judge who would de-
cide his case had laid down doctrine explaining what it would take to dis-
tinguish the prior authority, and Gibbons duly characterized his case as 
qualifying for the distinction.  That said, the coasting-license argument may 
have been hard to make with a straight face.  Modern audiences may not 
intuit that fact, because the rubric of the coasting trade and its licenses is 
not familiar to us.  But a lawyer or a merchant shipper in 1820—and Gib-
bons was both—would have understood that a federal coasting license was 
not a warrant to navigate at will.  It was simply an authorization to partici-
pate in the coasting trade—that is, trade by water among points within the 
United States—on the favorable terms accorded to American vessels, rather 
than the less favorable terms applicable to foreign ships.192 
In an effort to give American shippers an advantage relative to their Eu-
ropean competitors, Congress had required foreign ships arriving at or de-
parting from American ports to pay tonnage fees and comply with various 
other regulations from which American ships were exempt.193  A coasting 
license identified a vessel as entitled to the preferential treatment given to 
the home team.194  But such a license did not confer a general immunity 
from local regulation.  It simply exempted the vessel from burdens imposed 
by the particular federal statutory scheme under which the license was giv-
en.195  So consider, by analogy, the modern regime under which federal law 
 
190 See id. 
191 The idea that a coasting license created a federally guaranteed right to navigate did not originate 
with Gibbons.  In earlier efforts to resist New York’s monopoly, other steamboat operators had 
considered the same tactic.  They did not meet with success, but neither was the issue ever fully 
litigated in court prior to the Gibbons litigation.  See, e.g., COX, supra note 50, at 35, 75 (describ-
ing prior attempts to use the coasting-license argument). 
192 For example, the Act of Feb. 18, 1793, ch. 8, 1 Stat. 305 indicates that vessels engaging in the 
coasting trade and carrying only U.S. products without coasting licenses would be taxed as if 
they  powered foreign vessels. See generally Act of Sept. 1, 1789, ch. 11, 1 Stat. 55; Act of July 
20, 1790, ch. 30, 1 Stat. 135 (providing for a registration scheme and imposing duties on the ton-
nage of ships or vessels at different rates based on origin). 
193 Act of July 20, 1790, ch. 30, 1 Stat. 135. 
194 Act of Feb. 18, 1793, ch. 8, 1 Stat. 305.  The 1793 Act and its original predecessor, the Act of 
Sept. 1, 1789, ch. 11, 1 Stat. 55, both make clear that coasting licenses were only available to 
ships of the United States. 
195 See supra note 192–194 and accompanying text. 
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favors domestic air carriers over their foreign competition by permitting 
only the domestic carriers to transport passengers within the United States.  
Nobody believes that the domestic carriers’ right to conduct that business is 
tantamount to a right to operate its aircraft however and wherever it pleas-
es, regardless of local law—say, by taxiing off of an airport tarmac and 
along city streets.196  Nor do we think that commercial trucks registered 
with the United States Department of Transportation are thereby exempted 
from local speed limits or empowered to drive on roads that local officials 
designate as off-limits to large commercial vehicles.197  There is a federal 
regulatory scheme, and there is a local scheme, but the former does not su-
persede the latter, because they cover different ground. 
Given the weakness of Gibbons’s argument about the coasting trade, it 
seems unlikely that competent counsel would have expected the contention 
to fool Chancellor Kent.  But competent counsel might also have known 
that judges sometimes credit weak and slippery arguments when doing so 
helps them reach results that they believe to be justified on the merits, and 
Gibbons may have thought that Kent would welcome a semi-plausible pre-
text for ruling against the steamboat monopoly.  In at least one earlier 
chancery suit, Kent had read the terms of the steamboat monopoly narrow-
ly, pronouncing himself duty-bound to uphold the letter of the law but dis-
inclined to stretch the monopoly’s reach any farther than he was required 
to.198  Gibbons may therefore have hoped that the Chancellor would look 
favorably on an invitation to undermine the monopoly if presented with a 
case that differed from Van Ingen in precisely the way that Kent had sug-
gested could make the difference.  So into Chancery Gibbons went, bran-
dishing his coasting license.199 
 
196 Federal statutes regulating common carriers do preempt a fair amount of state law, of course—
but not everything.  They preempt only what is held to be within the intended scope of the rele-
vant statutory scheme.  See, e.g., Geier v. Am. Honda Motor Co., 529 U.S. 861 (2000) (analyzing 
the extent of a federal statute’s preemptive reach by reference to Congress’s express or implied 
intention for the scope of the statutory policy). 
197 I thank Jennifer Fischell for suggesting this example. 
198 See Livingston v. Ogden, 4 Johns. Ch. 48, 52 (N.Y. Ch. 1819) (refusing to extend the privilege of 
navigating boats by steam beyond the clear directive of the law).  I do not mean to suggest that 
Kent was unequivocally critical of the monopoly.  In Van Ingen, seven years before, Kent had 
expressed the view that the state’s original grant of an exclusive franchise had been a salutary 
thing.  Livingston v. Van Ingen, 9 Johns. 507, 578–79 (N.Y. 1812) (opinion of Kent, C.J.).  But 
Kent’s later expression of diffidence was likely salient to Gibbons, coming as it did in a more re-
cent case and one to which Gibbons was a party.  And at any rate it would not be surprising for a 
party in interest to read such a statement as a ray of hope about what the decisionmaker might do 
if given a future opportunity; interested parties have a way of reading ambiguous signals in ways 
that comport with their own desires. 
199 See COX, supra note 50, at 112 (describing Gibbons’ increasingly contentious attitude toward the 
legal status quo). 
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It didn’t work.  Perhaps Kent was less diffident about the monopoly 
than Gibbons hoped.  Perhaps he was simply too scrupulous about the 
meaning of a coasting license.  Or perhaps it was some of each.  But for 
whatever reasons, Gibbons’s coasting-license argument flopped.  Yes, Kent 
wrote, a valid federal statute providing that all steamboats were entitled to 
navigate the waters of the several states notwithstanding any local regula-
tion would resolve the case in favor of Gibbons.200  He had indicated as 
much seven years earlier in Van Ingen.201  But the statute under which the 
federal government gave licenses to participate in the coasting trade was 
nothing like such a law.202  Indeed, Kent wrote, if Gibbons’s argument were 
correct, there would have been no point in New York’s granting the exclu-
sive privilege in the first place, because the coasting-license system predat-
ed that grant, and licenses were easy to get.203  Surely the legally sophisti-
cated Robert Livingston—one of Kent’s own predecessors as Chancellor of 
New York—had not been so obtuse as to expend much capital and great 
energy only to procure monopoly privileges that could be defeated “with as 
much facility as the flag of the United States could be procured and hoist-
ed . . . . If the state laws were not absolutely null and void from the begin-
ning, they require a greater power than a simple coasting license, to disarm 
them.”204  It was a pretty good rejoinder. 
The highest court in New York affirmed Chancellor Kent in a brief 
opinion indicating, essentially, that Gibbons was wasting everyone’s 
time.205  Van Ingen was the law, and the coasting license did absolutely 
nothing to distinguish the present case.206  Notably, however, the New York 
court’s unanimous opinion did not deny that Congress had the authority to 
make laws overriding Ogden’s license.  It said rather that the statutes regu-
lating the coasting trade did not purport to have that effect.207 
But the aftermath of a decision in New York’s highest court would be 
different this time.  Eight years earlier, the challengers in Van Ingen de-
clined to pursue an appeal to the United States Supreme Court after losing 
in state court.  Robert Livingston had offered to license their ferries (for an 
appropriate price, of course) if they would acquiesce in his right to the ex-
clusive franchise, and, as the parties were essentially motivated by their 
 
200 Ogden v. Gibbons, 4 Johns. Ch. 150, 158 (N.Y. Ch. 1819). 
201 Van Ingen, 9 Johns. at 578–79 (opinion of Kent, C.J.). 
202 Ogden, 4 Johns. Ch. at 156–158. 
203 Id. at 158–59. 
204 Id. 
205 Gibbons v. Ogden, 17 Johns. 488, 508–10 (N.Y. 1820). 
206 Id. at 508–09. 
207 Id. 
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economic interests, they were able to strike a bargain.208  This time, the 
challenger was Gibbons, and his interests were not primarily economic.  
They were personal.  He wanted to crush Ogden, not to negotiate an ar-
rangement acceptable to both sides.  He had the financial resources to keep 
litigating and to retain the fanciest legal counsel in the land.209  There 
would be no settlement; Gibbons v. Ogden was headed to the United States 
Supreme Court. 
3.  Gibbons v. Ogden 
As we all know, the Supreme Court ruled that Gibbons’s federal license 
to pursue the coasting trade prevailed over New York’s law limiting the 
right to operate steamboats.  But the coasting license argument was no 
stronger in Washington, D.C. than it had been before the courts of New 
York.  Marshall decided to accept that argument in spite of its weakness, 
using the coasting license as a way out of having to resolve the big consti-
tutional issue that the case might otherwise demand be resolved.  (It would 
not be the first time, nor the last, that the Great Chief Justice would read 
statutory authority tendentiously in order to answer,210 or to avoid answer-
ing,211 a large constitutional question.)  That big issue was whether the 
commerce power was exclusive in Congress, such that New York could not 
grant a monopoly over steamboat travel in its waters regardless of whether 
Congress had acted. 
a.  Avoidance: John Marshall and the Coasting License 
Over the three days of oral argument, attorneys for both sides repeated-
ly argued about whether the commerce power was exclusive in Congress or 
enjoyed concurrently by Congress and the states.212  Daniel Webster, then 
serving as a Congressman from Massachusetts, opened the arguments for 
Gibbons by describing the acute state of legal conflict among New York 
and its neighboring states.213  New York permitted steamboat navigation 
 
208 See supra note 186 and accompanying text (describing the decision of many challengers to ac-
cept licenses from Livingston rather than continue their legal battle). 
209 For an accounting of Gibbons’s personal motivations, see supra Part I.A. 
210 See, e.g., Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 148, 175–76 (1803) (reading Section 13 of 
the Judiciary Act of 1789 as purporting to enlarge the original jurisdiction of the Supreme Court). 
211 See infra notes 225–226 and accompanying text (describing The Wilson v. United States, 30 F. 
Cas. 239 (C.C.D. Va. 1820), in which Marshall read Virginia law narrowly to avoid a constitu-
tional question). 
212 Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1, 8–17, 24–25, 60–64 (discussing the arguments of both 
parties regarding New York’s right to legislate). 
213 See JOHNSON, supra note 47, at 75–76 (discussing Webster’s strategy and his opening state-
ments). 
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only by a favored party; Connecticut retaliated by prohibiting steamboat 
navigation within its waters by anyone licensed to operate steamboats un-
der the law of New York; New Jersey made anyone enforcing New York’s 
monopoly liable to the amount of treble damages.214  This mess, said Web-
ster, was exactly the sort of pernicious interstate rivalry that the Constitu-
tion had been adopted to eliminate; the Constitution was to solve the prob-
lem by divesting the states of the power to do such things and instead 
placing the power to regulate commerce exclusively in one central gov-
ernment.215  To think that the Founders would have imagined the Constitu-
tion they were creating would permit states to carry on squabbling as New 
York and its neighbors were, Webster maintained, would be little short of 
crazy.216 
One Associate Justice agreed with Webster squarely.  In an opinion 
concurring in the Court’s judgment, Justice William Johnson wrote that the 
power to regulate commerce lay exclusively in Congress.217  Coasting li-
cense or no coasting license, Justice Johnson explained, New York could 
not create an exclusive right to operate steamboats and thus restrain “free 
intercourse among the states.”218  But the rest of the Court did not go that 
far.  Marshall’s majority opinion did express sympathy with the view that 
Congress had exclusive power over commerce: that construction of the 
commerce power, he wrote, had “great force.”219  But it was not necessary, 
he reasoned, to decide the big issue, because a statutory ground of decision 
was available—that is, the coasting license.220  Congress had acted to regu-
late the coasting trade, Marshall wrote, and those actions gave Gibbons a 
right to navigate within the waters of the United States, including the wa-
ters of New York.221  Regardless of whether Congress’s commerce power 
preempted New York’s regulation even in the absence of conflict between 
state and federal statutes, it was clear that in the presence of a conflict New 
York’s law must give way.222 
Now, as noted before, it would be a mistake to take Marshall at face 
value here.  He knew everything that Chancellor Kent knew about the 
coasting trade laws, and if he hadn’t, Kent’s opinion would have explained 
it clearly enough.  But Marshall’s inclinations about the real issue in the 
case were different from Kent’s.  Unlike the New Yorker, who argued for 
 
214 Gibbons, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) at 1–2, 4–5, 8 (1824). 
215 Id. at 11–14. 
216 Id. at 17. 
217 Id. at 226–29 (Johnson, J., concurring in the judgment). 
218 Id. at 231, 239. 
219 Id. at 209. 
220 Id. at 209–13. 
221 Id. at 211–13. 
222 Id. 
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concurrent authority to regulate commerce, Chief Justice Marshall seems to 
have favored the view that Clause iii described a power lying exclusively 
with Congress.223  But he preferred not to base his decision on that ground.  
Indeed, Gibbons was just one of a series of cases in which Marshall praised 
the exclusive-power theory but stopped short of writing it into law, always 
reaching the result that the exclusive-power theory would dictate but on 
statutory rather than constitutional authority.224  Four years before Gibbons, 
in a case that Marshall decided while riding circuit, the Chief Justice by the 
force of aggressive statutory construction avoided deciding whether a Vir-
ginia law barring the entry of free black sailors was void for trenching on 
Congress’s exclusive commerce power.225  To be clear, the characterization 
of Marshall’s statutory construction in that case as aggressive is consistent 
with Marshall’s self-understanding.  In a letter to his colleague Justice Jo-
seph Story about his resolution of that case, Marshall wrote that the consti-
tutional issue had been presented, but that he had “escaped on the construc-
tion of the act.”226  Three years after Gibbons, in the next Supreme Court 
case presenting the question of whether Congress’s commerce power was 
exclusive, Marshall would once again hold a state law preempted on the 
strength of a strained argument about conflict with a federal statute227 rather 
than by holding—as counsel challenging the law again urged—that the 
commerce power was exclusive.228  He had a modus operandi: praise the 
 
223 See id. at 209 (deeming the argument for concurrent authority unconvincing and recognizing 
“great force” in the argument for exclusive authority). 
224 See, e.g., cases described infra, notes 225 and 227 (regarding two other occasions where Mar-
shall favored the exclusive-power argument but used statutory interpretation to avoid the consti-
tutional question). 
225 See The Wilson v. United States, 30 F. Cas. 239, 245 (Marshall, Circuit Justice, C.C.D. Va. 
1820) (No. 17,846) (invalidating the forfeiture of the brig Wilson).  The brig Wilson had been de-
clared forfeit to the United States in consequence of having violated federal law upon docking in 
Norfolk, and one of the alleged violations was of a federal statute barring the entry of nonwhite 
persons into states forbidding their entry.  Id. at 240, 243.  The federal statute was thus parasitic 
on state statutes; it imposed penalties only in cases where a state law regulating entry was violat-
ed.  Id. at 243 n.3.  A relevant Virginia law prohibited the entry of “free negroes and mulattoes,” 
id. at 245, and the Wilson’s crew included several free nonwhite sailors who had gone ashore in 
Norfolk.  Id. at 240.  Among his other interpretive moves, Marshall noted that the record below 
identified the sailors in question as “persons of colour” but contained no indication that they 
were “negroes or mulattoes,” rather than other sorts of colored persons.  Id. at 245.  According to 
Marshall, that meant that no statutory violation had been shown.  Id.  And in the absence of a 
statutory violation, the case against the Wilson could be dismissed without having to ask whether 
the Virginia law was unconstitutional.  Id. 
226 Letter from John Marshall to Joseph Story (Sept. 26, 1823), in 9 THE PAPERS OF JOHN 
MARSHALL 338 (Charles F. Hobson ed., 1998) [hereinafter Letter]. 
227 See Brown v. Maryland, 25 U.S. (12 Wheat.) 419, 44–48 (1827) (holding that a state law taxing 
the sale of imported goods was preempted by existing federal law authorizing importation with-
out specifying which federal law created the conflict or what the nature of the conflict might be). 
228 See id. at 420, 424 (summarizing Mr. Meredith’s argument that the statute was unconstitutional).  
The Attorney General of the United States, William Wirt, seems to have caught on to Marshall’s 
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exclusive power idea, hold back from actually declaring that idea law, and 
resolve the case by reading a statute to direct the same result that exclusive 
congressional power would, whether it was easy to read the statute that way 
or not. 
Just why Marshall preferred to avoid ruling on the big issue is a ques-
tion about which we can only speculate.  Perhaps Marshall figured that, as 
long as he was the one construing federal statutes, he could find conflicts 
between federal and state laws whenever it was necessary, so he could get 
the same results in practice that he would get from a doctrine of complete 
preemption—and he could achieve them without a bold declaration of con-
stitutional law that might provoke retaliation from the powerful people fa-
voring the concurrent-power theory.229  More particularly, Marshall wor-
ried that a doctrine preempting all state laws regulating commerce would 
carry explosive implications for state laws related to race and slavery, as in 
the free-black-sailors case he decided while riding circuit in 1820.230  Many 
states in both the North and the South would have had powerfully negative 
reactions to the loss of their abilities to enable, prohibit, or regulate the sale 
of slaves.231  And some southern critics had already voiced the view that a 
constitutional rule barring states from prohibiting the entry of free blacks 
would be sufficient reason to abolish the Constitution.232 
 
predilection.  Having argued in Gibbons that the commerce power was exclusive in Congress, 
Wirt in Brown argued instead that Congress’s general statutory regulation of the field of imports 
was meant to embody a general policy with which Maryland’s law conflicted, even if there was 
no direct collision between the requirements of state and federal law.  Id. at 433–35.  In modern 
parlance, we might say that Wirt argued a theory of field preemption, albeit without specifying 
the particulars of the law preempting the field, and that Marshall was happy to use Wirt’s theory 
on the same terms. 
229 See generally LACROIX, supra note 137 (expounding upon some of the bitter political divisions 
related to this conflict). 
230 See The Wilson v. United States, 30 F. Cas. 239, 245 (C.C.D. Va. 1820) (No. 17,846) (holding 
that there was no violation of the Virginia statute “prevent[ing] the migration of free negroes and 
mulattoes.”). 
231 See Groves v. Slaughter, 40 U.S. (15 Pet.) 449, 506–08 (1841) (emphasizing the value that states 
placed on local control over the slave trade). 
232 In his letter to Story about The Wilson, see Letter, supra note 226, at 338, Marshall drew a con-
trast between his avoidance of the constitutional issue and Justice Johnson’s choice to reach the 
constitutional issue in a parallel South Carolina case in which Johnson had been the circuit jus-
tice.  As in Gibbons, Johnson was of the view that the federal commerce power was exclusive, so 
he ruled that South Carolina had no authority to block free black sailors from disembarking at the 
ports of that state. See id. at 338, 339 n.2 (recounting a recent case in which Johnson read the 
Commerce Clause expansively to find South Carolina’s Negro Seamen Act unconstitutional).  As 
Marshall related the events to Story, the reaction in South Carolina had been intensely negative, 
with South Carolinians protesting that, if the Constitution required this result, they would favor 
abolishing the Constitution.  See id. at 338 (saying that South Carolina regarded Johnson’s deci-
sion as an act of judicial usurpation, such that if this was the course the Constitution took, it 
would be “better to break that instrument”). 
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Whatever his precise mix of motives, it seems clear that Marshall pre-
ferred to reach the results in these cases on narrow grounds.  Given that 
preference, the coasting-license rationale in Gibbons suited Marshall nice-
ly.  A decision on that basis would end the steamboat standoff, enabling 
freer traffic in and around New York and staving off the threat of similar 
interstate rivalries in other parts of the country.  Crediting the coasting-
license argument thus gave Marshall all he needed to vindicate the national 
interest that vesting the commerce power exclusively in Congress was sup-
posed to serve, at least as to the problem before him.  And it let him avoid 
ruling definitively that the commerce power was exclusive in Congress—
something that he repeatedly declined to do, despite his obvious sympathies 
in that direction.  In short, Gibbons’s offer of a coasting-license fig leaf 
worked before the second great jurist to whom he presented it, even though 
it hadn’t worked before the first one. 
b.  Assurance: Limiting the Threat of Preemption 
Marshall also knew, however, that his officially ducking the big ques-
tion would neither make the issue disappear nor hide which way he and his 
Court were leaning.233  Knowing that his audience would probably under-
stand him to favor the exclusive-power approach, and perhaps foreseeing 
that lower courts would act upon it, it made sense for Marshall to present 
that view in its best light.  After all, the standard arguments against the ex-
clusive-power view raised some serious concerns.  If Marshall could satisfy 
or at least mitigate those concerns, his preferred approach would seem con-
siderably more attractive. 
One of the biggest criticisms of the exclusive-power position was that it 
would direct the preemption of an unreasonably large swath of state laws.  
Wickard lay more than a century in the future, but as noted above, even in 
the 1820s American lawyers understood that there were real-world eco-
nomic connections between local regulation and the larger commercial uni-
verse.234  If all state laws falling within the sphere that Congress could reg-
ulate under its commerce power were invalid, an awful lot of law was 
going to disappear.  The threat of judicially imposed deregulation on this 
 
233 Some lower courts treated Gibbons as authority for the exclusive-power position, even though 
technically Marshall had avoided such a holding.  See, e.g., N. River Steamboat Co. v. Living-
ston, 3 Cow. 713, 743 (N.Y. 1825) (interpreting earlier United States Supreme Court decisions as 
holding “[t]hat the power to regulate commerce among the states is exclusive”). 
234 See Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1, 65 (1824) (recounting Ogden’s counsel describing 
“a vast range of State legislation, such as turnpike roads, toll bridges, exclusive rights to run 
stage wagons, auction licenses, licenses to retailers,” and admitting that such laws “must neces-
sarily affect, to a great extent, the foreign trade, and . . . . trade and commerce with other 
States”). 
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remarkably broad scale figured as a prominent argument in favor of the 
concurrent-power view.  So throughout the Gibbons litigation, the defend-
ers of New York’s prerogative to regulate without preemption—including 
Chancellor Kent, to whom Marshall was careful to refer respectfully even 
while reversing his judgment235—had pointed to various kinds of garden-
variety state laws that would, on an exclusive-power view, be rendered in-
valid on the theory that they were regulations of, or affecting, commerce.236 
Marshall in Gibbons accordingly made sure to articulate limits on the 
preemptive force of the exclusive-power view.  To be precise, he articulat-
ed two kinds of limits.  One limit distinguished state regulations of com-
merce from state regulations affecting commerce.237  Health laws and in-
spection laws, for example, surely affected commerce, but they were not 
regulations of commerce per se.  So even if the regulation of commerce 
were exclusively vested in Congress, states would be able to enforce health 
laws, inspection laws, and the like.238  The other limit distinguished two 
subcategories within the realm of regulations of commerce: those falling 
within the federal commerce power, because they regulated the three clas-
ses of commerce enumerated in Clause iii, and those not falling within the 
federal commerce power, because they regulated only commerce internal to 
a single state.239  Because commerce wholly internal to a single state lay 
beyond the scope of the Clause, state laws regulating that commerce would 
not be preempted. 
In other words, Marshall’s statement that the enumeration in Clause iii 
presupposes something not enumerated was significant primarily as a limi-
tation on the preemptive scope of an exclusive federal commerce power.  
Deeming the power to regulate commerce exclusive in Congress would in-
deed preempt a fair amount of state law.  To be specific, it would preempt 
state regulations of (1) commerce with foreign nations, (2) commerce 
among the several states, and (3) commerce with the Indian tribes.  But 
readers should not worry, Marshall wished to say, that an exclusive federal 
commerce power would also preempt all sorts of state regulation that was 
properly regarded as local.  His articulation of a fourth class of commerce 
not included within the Commerce Clause—the purely internal commerce 
of a state—created a zone in which states could legislate, even on commer-
cial issues, without fear of judicial preemption. 
 
235 Id. at 186–187. 
236 See, e.g., Livingston v. Van Ingen, 9 Johns. 507, 568 (N.Y. 1812) (opinion of Thompson, J.) 
(enumerating various state regulations of commerce); id. at 580 (opinion of Kent, C.J.) (pointing 
to state Sunday laws, auction-licensing laws, and laws regulating roads and toll-bridges and as 
reasons why Congress’ commerce power should not be read as exclusive). 
237 Gibbons, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) at 203–05. 
238 Id. 
239 Id. at 194–95. 
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Between the two limitations Marshall offered—one distinguishing regu-
lations of commerce from regulations merely affecting commerce, and one 
carving off local commerce—most if not all of the laws that advocates of 
concurrent power warned would be preempted by an exclusive-power view 
would be saved.  Sunday laws, pauper laws, laws for building local bridges 
and turnpikes and even for the operation of ferries on intrastate routes—all 
these would remain valid exercises of state authority, because they would 
fall outside the domain of Congress’s exclusive Clause iii powers.  Specify-
ing that the enumeration presupposed something not enumerated was an 
important part of Marshall’s reassurance on this point.  Lower courts seem 
to have gotten the message.  When the New York judiciary handled succes-
sor litigation to Gibbons, the Court for the Correction of Errors proceeded 
as if the power to regulate commerce among the several states was exclu-
sive in Congress.240  But it also explained that the Commerce Clause did 
not preempt all of the local laws that earlier lawyers had worried must fall 
if the commerce power were exclusive in Congress.241  After all, the New 
York court wrote, Marshall had pointed out that the enumeration presup-
posed something unenumerated; not all commerce was within the Com-
merce Clause, so not all state commercial regulation was preempted.242 
But could Congress displace the local laws that Marshall’s reading pro-
tected from automatic preemption?  On that question, the Gibbons dictum 
had considerably less significance.  By limiting the reach of the Commerce 
Clause, Marshall promised areas of regulation in which state law would not 
be automatically preempted by an exclusive federal commerce power.  But 
Marshall did not say that Congress could never enter those areas.  On the 
contrary, it was clear that Congress could enter those areas, albeit not al-
ways on the strength of the Commerce Clause alone. 
Suppose, for example, that a state made a health law providing for the 
inspection of imported goods.  Under Marshall’s vision of an exclusive 
commerce power, that law would be a law affecting commerce, rather than 
a regulation of commerce as such, and therefore not automatically 
preempted.  A state law merely affecting commerce could easily conflict in 
practice with a valid federal law regulating commerce itself, or with federal 
regulations necessary and proper for carrying federal commerce legislation 
 
240 N. River Steamboat Co. v. Livingston, 3 Cow. 713, 743 (N.Y. 1825). 
241 Id. at 754–756. 
242 Id. at 749–50.  To be comprehensive, it is worth repeating that Marshall’s distinction between 
intrastate commerce and other commerce was one of two ways in which he assured his audience 
that an expansive commerce power would not be catastrophically preemptive.  The other was his 
distinction between regulations of commerce as such, which could be preempted even in the ab-
sence of conflicting federal enactments, and regulations merely affecting commerce, which 
would be preempted only in case of actual conflict with federal law.  See supra, text at footnotes 
238–239. 
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into execution.  In such a case, federal law would displace state law to the 
extent of the conflict between them.243  Similarly, states could make laws 
for the regulation of commerce falling outside the commerce power—that 
is, intrastate commerce—and although Congress could not displace those 
state laws by regulating intrastate commerce per se, it could displace those 
laws with regulations necessary and proper for carrying into execution fed-
eral laws regulating commerce among the several states—or with laws 
passed in the exercise of its patent power, or its taxing power, or its power 
to make bankruptcy laws.244  So on Marshall’s reading of the Commerce 
Clause, the enumeration of three classes of commerce limited the preemp-
tive scope of the commerce power, but it did not limit Congress’s ability to 
regulate matters affecting commerce.  After all, Congress’s ability to regu-
late is not given by the Commerce Clause alone.  It includes the power 
specified in that Clause and also many other powers specified in many oth-
er clauses.245 
D.  Letting Go 
As described above, modern constitutional law enables Congress to 
regulate all commerce, even though the Commerce Clause enumerates 
three kinds of commerce in particular.246  Justice Scalia maintained a view 
of this modern reality that is fully reconcilable with Marshall’s reading of 
the commerce power in Gibbons.  In Justice Scalia’s version of the doc-
trine, Congress may not regulate purely intrastate commerce with its com-
merce power, but it may do so under the Necessary and Proper Clause.247  
The dominant doctrinal rendering is less scrupulous about this difference: 
 
243 See, e.g., N. River Steamboat Co., 3 Cow. at 751 (stating that “[i]f the several states may still 
regulate commerce, within the limits of their states, to the exclusion of congress, there is nothing 
left for congress to act upon”); id. at 753 (“[Congress having] power to regulate commerce 
among the states, that power must necessarily reach the subject where it exists; and so far as nav-
igation is concerned, it exists where the coasting trade exists, and is therefore subject to the regu-
lation of congress.”). 
244 See, e.g., id. at 754 (recognizing the authority of Congress to exercise its taxing power on intra-
state ferries even when those ferries were beyond the reach of the commerce power). 
245 As discussed earlier, this basic fact should make clear that Marshall’s description of wholly in-
trastate commerce as “reserved for the State” under the Commerce Clause, Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 
U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1, 195 (1824), cannot mean that such commerce is immune from federal regula-
tion.  It means that states retain the power to regulate intrastate commerce, rather than having lost 
that power to the Clause’s automatic preemptive force.  But federal legislation under any of sev-
eral powers might supersede such state regulation.  See supra Part I.C.3. (finding the Gibbons’ 
dictum states that purely intrastate commerce is not within the scope of the Commerce Clause). 
246 See supra Part I.C.3. (explaining why Shreveport, Wickard, Lopez, and Raich confirm this posi-
tion). 
247 See Gonzales v. Raich, 545 U.S. 1, 33–35 (2005) (Scalia, J., concurring) (stating that “[w]here 
necessary to make a regulation of interstate commerce effective, Congress may regulate even 
those intrastate activities that do not themselves substantially affect interstate commerce”). 
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in several modern cases, the Court simply treats the Commerce Clause it-
self as authorizing the regulation of all commerce with substantial effects 
on interstate commerce, which as a practical matter means all commerce, 
period.248  That modern view of the Commerce Clause abandons the line 
that Marshall drew in Gibbons. 
But modern doctrine also eliminates the problem to which Marshall’s 
Gibbons dictum was a solution.  Marshall needed to limit the scope of the 
Commerce Clause—not the scope of Congress’s regulatory power over all 
things affecting commerce, but the scope of the Commerce Clause in par-
ticular—because his view that the Commerce Clause created an exclusively 
federal sphere would have otherwise ousted the states of necessary regula-
tory powers.  But the exclusive-power view of Clause iii has not prevailed.  
Marshall’s successor as Chief Justice, Roger B. Taney, was a strong propo-
nent of the concurrent-power alternative.249  By the 1850s, the Court de-
clared that at least some forms of commerce were fit objects of state regula-
tion, even if those forms of commerce had interstate effects.250  And by the 
end of the nineteenth century, the dominant view was that states could reg-
ulate their internal commerce as a default matter, so long as their internal 
regulations did not unduly burden interstate commerce or, in an alternative 
formulation, so long as they did not regulate interstate commerce “direct-
ly.”251  The modern view is at least as solicitous of state regulation: today, 
constitutional doctrine draws no particular line between state regulations of 
“commerce” and other kinds of police-power regulation, all of which is 
valid unless it affirmatively conflicts with federal regulations or constitu-
tional prohibitions. 
To be sure, one subset of the constitutional prohibitions facing states is 
that of dormant commerce doctrine, which preempts some state laws even 
when the federal government has laid down no conflicting rules. But as 
noted above, modern dormant commerce preemption does not block state 
laws on the theory that the state has usurped a power that belongs exclu-
sively to Congress.  It is concerned instead, mostly and imperfectly, with 
problems of interstate protectionism and perhaps also with regulatory 
choices that without being protectionist as such create burdens on interstate 
commerce that seem inordinate in comparison to the local benefits they se-
 
248 See, e.g., id. at 32–33 (majority opinion) (describing the activities at issue as within the com-
merce power because such activities in the aggregate affect interstate commerce).  Justice Scal-
ia’s concurrence in Raich was necessary, in Justice Scalia’s view, precisely because of this dif-
ference between his own approach and that of the majority.  Id. at 33 (Scalia, J., concurring). 
249 See supra note 161 and accompanying text (describing Taney’s position). 
250 See Cooley v. Board of Wardens, 53 U.S. (12 How.) 299, 315 (1851) (finding a specific form of 
state regulation of commerce “not repugnant” to the Constitution). 
251 See Lessig, supra note 40, at 160–62 (describing this late-nineteenth-century view). 
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cure.252  A state law that regulates commerce without posing one of those 
particular problems is not subject to preemption. 
If the power to regulate commerce is essentially concurrent in Congress 
and the states, then it does not matter much whether the Commerce 
Clause’s enumeration of three classes of commerce presumes a fourth and 
unenumerated class.  Whether it does or not, that enumeration does not lim-
it the commerce that can be regulated by states, because the states are enti-
tled to regulate until and unless Congress does.  Nor does the enumeration 
limit the commerce that Congress can regulate.  Any commercial activity, 
if aggregated, can sufficiently affect interstate commerce so as to be a valid 
subject of federal regulation.253  The reality of economic interconnected-
ness was apparent even in Marshall’s time, but the threat of widespread 
preemption under an exclusive-power view created a reason for refusing to 
make that fact the foundation of a general federal power over commerce.  
The end of the exclusive-power theory brought the end of that threat of 
preemption and, accordingly, the end of the reason for insisting that some 
commerce lay beyond the classes of commerce specified in Clause iii.  In 
short, Marshall’s Gibbons dictum was the solution to a problem that consti-
tutional law had ceased to face by the end of the nineteenth century.  Which 
might be why that dictum did not appear in twentieth-century caselaw—
until the Lopez Court used it to mean something that Marshall did not in-
tend. 
CONCLUSION 
Marshall’s Gibbons dictum is one of the leading formulas that modern 
courts and commentators use as support for the internal-limits canon.  As I 
have shown, that use of the dictum strays from what Marshall meant.  To 
be sure, the internal-limits canon might be sound even if Marshall did not 
endorse it.  But as it happens, the canon is unsound, for reasons I have ex-
plained at length elsewhere.254  To persuade the profession to change its 
thinking about the internal-limits canon, it is helpful not just to give the 
reasons why the canon is unsound but also to show that various authorities 
that are supposed to support the canon actually do not.  If courts and com-
mentators would stop misusing the Gibbons dictum, the profession would 
be one important step closer to seeing that the internal-limits canon is not a 
necessary principle of constitutional interpretation. 
 
252 See supra note 158 and accompanying text (describing this modern view). 
253 See supra Part I.C.3 (reviewing settled doctrine to show that all commerce is regulable under 
Congress’s commerce power). 
254 See Primus, supra note 11, at 581–82 (arguing that the “internal-limits canon” is unsound). 
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Sometimes lawyers say things because they make sense.  And some-
times we say things because they made sense once upon a time and we 
have become accustomed to saying them, and we do not notice that the 
conditions that made the statements sensible in the past are no longer the 
relevant conditions.  The repetition of outmoded axioms is a particular haz-
ard of a common-law legal culture.  Perhaps it is impossible to solve that 
problem completely.  The invocation of old and canonical cases to shape 
our sense of the system is a hard-wired feature of American constitutional 
thought, and even intelligent lawyers acting in good faith will not always 
know the historical context that explains why an inherited formula might 
have outlived its applicability.  The use and adaptation of traditional au-
thority is always a process of both reading and misreading; a long-lived 
constitutional system without the misinterpretation of one generation by 
another is, in a word, inconceivable. 
 But some mistakes are both patent and potentially damaging, and they 
should be avoided.  Marshall wrote that the enumeration of three classes of 
commerce in the Commerce Clause presupposed a fourth class of com-
merce that lies beyond the commerce power.  He did not say that the Con-
stitution’s overall enumeration of congressional powers indicates that the 
sum total of those powers must in practice be less than a general grant of 
regulatory authority.  That is, he did not say that the enumeration principle 
requires the internal limits canon.  Neither should we—and certainly not on 
the premise that he told us so. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
